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Article

The Death of the Firm
June Carbone† & Nancy Levit††
INTRODUCTION
A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings
to achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies the rights
and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and
employees) who are associated with a corporation in one way or
another. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are
extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these
people.1

In the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby—and more generally in corporate and employment law—
the firm as entity is disappearing as a unit of legal analysis. We
use the term “firm” in this Article in the sense that Ronald Coase
did to describe a form of business organization that orders the
production of goods and services through use of a system internal
to the enterprise rather than through the use of independent
contractors.2 The idea of an “entity” in this sense refers to an
† Robina Chair in Law, Science and Technology, University of Minnesota
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Curators’ and Edward D. Ellison Professor
of Law, University of Missouri – Kansas City School of Law. We thank William
K. Black, Margaret F. Brinig, Naomi Cahn, Paul Callister, Mary Ann Case,
Lynne Dallas, Robert Downs, Max Eichner, Martha Fineman, Claire Hill, Brett
McDonnell, Amy Monahan, Charles O’Kelley, Hari Osofsky, Irma Russell, Dan
Schwarcz, Lynn Stout, and Erik P.M. Vermeulen for their helpful comments on
drafts of this Article and Tracy Shoberg and Shiveta Vaid for their research
support. Copyright © 2017 by June Carbone & Nancy Levit.
1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
2. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390–93
(1937). The term “corporation,” in contrast, refers to a particular type of
business organization with a corporate charter. Stefan J. Padfield,
Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 331 (2014). Thus, while
all corporations are in some sense “firms,” not all firms are corporations. For
other discussions of the legal significance of the firm concept, see Reuven S. AviYonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1001–
33 (2010) (summarizing the literature on the status of the corporation); Timothy
P. Glynn, Taking the Employer out of Employment Law? Accountability for Wage
and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 15 EMP. RTS. &
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institution that is greater than the sum of its parts, one that has
a legal existence, recognizable identity, and loyalty claims
independent of the individuals who may own it or control it at
any given time.3 Popular accounts sometimes read Hobby Lobby
and similar decisions as conferring rights on the entity and thus
enhancing the institutional character of the claims, insisting, as
presidential candidate Mitt Romney did in 2012 that
“[c]orporations are people, my friend.”4
As Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Hobby Lobby makes
clear, however, reading these opinions as enhancing the
institutional character of the rights conferred would be a
mistake. Instead, these decisions are the culmination of a
decades-long attack on the reification of the corporation and an
assault on the very notion of corporate interests separate from
the narrowly defined interests of a company’s immediate owners.
These decisions, even as they recognize corporate First
Amendment claims, erode the status of the corporation as an
entity that imposes institutional constraints on executive
freedom of action, has institutional obligations to its employees,
or can be held institutionally accountable as a community
citizen. Within this jurisprudence, the corporation becomes, as
Justice Alito observes, a means to an end,5 no different from the
corporate jet or the supply contract with a Chinese subsidiary.
Thus, Hobby Lobby and the line of cases it represents signals the
“death of the firm” as an important component of legal analysis
across a variety of fields.
This Article is the first to consider the implications of this
ideological shift in the treatment of the firm with respect to the
corresponding construction of business entities as appropriate
partners for the government in advancing public purposes.
Following Hobby Lobby, many scholars have questioned the
decision on three grounds. First, First Amendment scholars have
challenged the Court’s conclusion that a corporation can exercise
EMP. POL’Y J. 201, 203 (2011) (describing the impact of firm disaggregation on
employees).
3. This idea of an entity that supplies identity and commands loyalty is
rooted in media theory and remains influential in the management literature
as a way to motivate employees. See infra text accompanying notes 56–59.
4. Maureen Dowd, Power to the Corporation!, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2011,
at SR11.
5. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768; see also GERALD F. DAVIS, THE
VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE HAZARDS OF A NEW
ECONOMY 77–79 (2016) (describing the difficulty of holding corporations
accountable for actions taken within their supply chains).
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religious rights and, if so, in what circumstances. 6 Second,
constitutional scholars have explored the status of corporate
entities, with some arguing that corporations are creations of the
State, and thus can be defined and regulated in whatever ways
the State chooses, and others arguing that corporations have
constitutional standing that imposes some limits on government
action. 7 Third, corporate scholars have revisited the issue of
management fiduciary duties, questioning whether managers
must seek to advance the firm’s commercial interests or whether
they can promote other values, such as religious or civic
interests.8 What all three critiques have in common is that they
assume that a system of employer-provided, governmentsubsidized health care (and implicitly other benefits) is
appropriate.
This Article takes a different approach. It takes seriously
the Supreme Court embrace of the firm as a mere fiction9 that
6. Besides questioning the reasoning of the Hobby Lobby decision itself,
these critiques raise two additional questions that are beyond the scope of this
paper. The first is who defines the religious stance of a corporate entity. The
logic of the Hobby Lobby majority suggests that the question is a matter of
contract among the owners. See Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby
Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 790–91 (2015) (discussing the ability of corporate
officers to advance ends other than profit maximization). Hobby Lobby is
unusual in that it is a closely held corporation, with a religious statement of
purposes in its corporate charter, and it is therefore not clear how many other
entities will thus be able to assert such a purpose. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at
2765–66. The second broader issue is whether commercial actors generally can
impose their religious preferences on others who do not share such preferences
in the context of commercial decisions. See Elizabeth Sepper, Gendering
Corporate Conscience, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 193, 232 (2015) (discussing
interaction of religious liberty and anti-discrimination law).
7. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 2 (summarizing the literature on the status
of the corporation and arguing that the issue has never been definitely
resolved); Padfield, supra note 2, at 331–32 (arguing that corporations are
creations of the State, and thus the government can impose conditions on the
grant of corporate charters).
8. See McDonnell, supra note 6.
9. The firm is not, however, a complete fiction as it is an entity chartered
by law with the power to enter into contracts and perform other binding acts.
See Lynn Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity,
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
685, 705 n.61 (2015) (“Even thoughtful observers sometimes describe
corporations as ‘legal fictions.’ Any good lawyer knows this phrase is an
oxymoron. There is nothing fictional about legal institutions, which exercise
enormous influence over human beings. That corporations are invisible does not
make them fictional or unreal. Gravity, too, is invisible.”). In a similar sense,
corporations may voluntarily assume contractual obligations to their
employees, it is just that these obligations do not follow automatically from the
nature of the business entity.
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serves no purpose and has no obligations other than the interests
of its owners, and considers the consequences of that shift for the
advancement of public purposes. It locates the Court’s
endorsement of this limited conception of the firm in two longstanding changes that reinforce each other. First, an ideological
shift rejected mid-twentieth-century managerialism, which had
treated firms as more than the sum of their parts, and replaced
it with agency-cost theory that treated the firm as a mere nexus
of contracts. 10 The agency-cost movement accused the
managerial era firms of complacency, celebrated the corporate
takeover market of 1980s, embraced “pay for performance”
schemes that greatly increased executive compensation, and
today cheers on the activist investors who focus corporate
attention on maximizing short-term share prices. 11 In this
perspective, the owners of a privately held company like Hobby
Lobby are free to treat the company (and its employees) however
they like and large publicly traded corporations, with thousands
of employees, serve no interests other than to maximize the
return to their shareholders. This ideological movement marked
the “death of the firm” as a subject of importance in management
theory and in the legal regulation of corporate interests.
Second, an era of technological change and globalization has
replaced the brick-and-mortar behemoths of the industrial era
with more network-like commercial entities. This second change
marks the rise of companies that continually reconstitute
themselves. They change product lines, spin off underperforming
divisions and acquire new ones, employ an ever-changing cast of
millennial “knowledge nomads”12 in their skilled ranks, replace
the less skilled with a contingent workforce (or robots), and
relocate factories, warehouses, and headquarters to the
countries or regions with the lowest costs, best quality, and most

10. See, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, The Misapplication of Mr.
Michael Jensen: How Agency Theory Brought down the Economy and Why It
Might Again, in MARKETS ON TRIAL: THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF THE U.S.
FINANCIAL CRISIS 29–32 (Michael Lounsbury & Paul M. Hirsch eds., 2010),
http://www.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dobbin/files/the_misapplication_of_mr._
michael_jensen_dobbin_and_jung.pdf (summarizing agency-cost theory).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 178–179, 199, 246–251.
12. Mallory Stark, High Turnover: Should You Care?, HARV. BUS. WK.
(July 26, 2004), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4277.html; see also PWC, TALENT
MOBILITY: 2020 AND BEYOND 19 (2012) (noting that among millennials in
business and technology, thirty-eight percent are “always actively on the
lookout for other opportunities,” while another forty-three percent are not
actively looking, “but would be open to offers”).
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attractive tax incentives.13 Thus, a furniture company can sell
sofas made with hardwoods that come from Thailand one year
and Malaysia the next, with engineered fiberboard filling in. The
sofa’s heralded “Italian leather” may be processed in Italy, but
the hides come from Northern Europe—or Argentina. The
leather and the hardwoods may then travel across the globe with
assembly in the Ukraine or China or Vietnam as labor market
conditions shift, and robots that can substitute for the workers
involved in riveting, shipping, or warehouse supply. A brand
such as “Natuzzi” may signal a guarantee of quality, but its
owners, employees, distribution networks, and even corporate
headquarters can shift over time.14
These two movements reinforce each other: the ideological
change contributed to a management focus on shorter-term and
more reductionist objectives while technological change and
globalization have created more opportunities for the flexible
and the nimble. Taken together, both change the relationships
between employers and employees, and both call into question
the use of the firm to supply basic necessities such as health care
and pensions, and to serve as suitable partners for public
purposes.
In this Article, we document the “death of the firm,” that is,
the ideological shift from celebration of the firm as bigger than
the sum of its parts to denigration of the firm as a “fiction” that
obscures analysis of the human interests at stake, and the
corresponding change from the large, stable corporations of the
industrial era to the more dynamic networks of the technological
13. Within the United States, these trends tend to focus on the movement
abroad. Jim Tankersley, America’s Top Execs Seem Ready To Give up on U.S.
Workers, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
storyline/wp/2014/09/11/americas-top-execs-seem-ready-to-give-up-on-u-s
-workers. For example, one study of Harvard Business School alumni, many of
whom are at the helm of major corporations, showed that fifty-six of those
surveyed recounted instances of moving one thousand or more jobs abroad and
zero cases of moving that number of jobs from abroad into the United States.
Id. Jobs that move abroad, however, do not necessarily stay permanently in the
country to which the move occurs.
14. For an examination of these trends, see LUC BOLTANSKI & EVE
CHIAPELLO, THE NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Gregory Elliott trans., 2007)
(discussing major changes in capitalist systems, including subdelegation). In
the nineties, Business Week heralded these developments as the rise of the
“virtual corporation,” which operated as a “network of independent companies—
suppliers, customers, even erstwhile rivals—linked by information technology
. . . [with] neither central office nor organization chart.” John Byrne, The Virtual
Corporation, BUS. WK. (Feb. 7, 1993), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/1993-02-07/the-virtual-corporation.
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age. We argue that just as the State of the industrial era grew in
response to the concentrated power of manufacturing firms so,
too, must the State of the technological era complement and
offset the new concentrations of power and better equip workers
to meet the challenges of the new era.
In Part I, we trace the rise of the corporation in America,
examining the changing relationships between management and
labor, and between firms and the State. This Part shows how
corporate theory, even as it develops over time, keeps coming
back to the same issues: the challenges of changing labor needs
and the destructive tendencies of unchecked concentrations of
power.
Part II explains the forces that have changed the ideological
and material treatment of commercial production. This Part
describes the rise of the agency-cost theorists of the seventies,
the ideological assault they inspired on the idea of the firm, the
changing impact of executive compensation and financial
markets on corporate objectives, culminating in the death of the
firm of the industrial era and the rise of more fluid corporate
networks.
Part III examines the implications of these changed
relationships—between labor and management, between
corporations and government—for the treatment of the firm.
Hobby Lobby, in describing the corporation as no more than a
vehicle to advance other interests, changes the assumptions on
which public-private partnerships are based. Public
subsidization of employer-provided health care arose in an era
in which secure employment with a large employer was the
norm. The recognition of the rights of owners to impose
idiosyncratic limits on employee access to state benefits raises
the issue of whether the State should subsidize employer
benefits at all. Instead, the logic of the decision suggests that the
ultimate goal of health care reform should be to eliminate the
employer role altogether; health care can be provided directly to
individuals either through exchanges that connect private
companies with individuals or through a single-payer system.
Employer-provided health care has become an anachronism.
The latter portion of Part III analyzes what such recreation
of the relationship between State, firm, and individual might
look like more generally. Unions—and the stable, wellcompensated employment contracts they championed—arose in
response to the nature of the firms of the industrial age. In an
era of commercial entities as networks that continually reform

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2870076

ARTICLE_CLEAN COPY_MINN_NOV_14.DOCX

2017]

11/15/2016 2:42 PM

THE DEATH OF THE FIRM

1037

in response to changing circumstances, the appropriate response
may be to reconsider the sources of worker resilience and
autonomy. Just as Hobby Lobby’s owners are free to impose their
religious values on the terms of corporate health care, so too
should Hobby Lobby’s employees be able to obtain health care
and other forms of social insurance on terms independent of
their employment. The rebuilding of the terms of exchange in the
information age should be reciprocal ones that empower
individuals on both ends of these transactions to become more
nimble and adept players in a changing global marketplace.
As firms change from entities with stable identities,
investments in long-term employees, and community-based
commitments to ever-shifting networks designed to maximize
the interests of the transient few,15 the opportunities they offer
for public-private partnerships change. The new partnerships
should be based on flexibility rather than stability, and they
should promote individual resilience rather than assume that
employment alone will address long-term worker needs.16 The
idea of the firm, at least at the height of the managerial era in
mid-twentieth-century America, assumed that business,
employee, and public interests overlapped. In an era that
dismisses firms as no more than vehicles to advance their
owners’ narrowly defined or idiosyncratic interests, the sources
of individual flexibility and security also need to shift from
within to outside private business structures. While the holding
of Hobby Lobby is limited to closely held companies, its dictum
is far-reaching: it marks the end of the firm as an instrument of
collective well-being.
I. THE RISE OF THE CORPORATION AND THE
SUPPRESSION OF THE MARKET
The one part of Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court in Hobby
Lobby that commands widespread agreement is the statement
that commercial entities are a means to an end rather than ends
in themselves.17 Nonetheless, the debate about the appropriate
purposes of the firm is as old as the corporation itself, and for
15. See DAVIS, supra note 5, at 122–24 (describing the move toward more
transient employment); Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Corporate Governance in a
Networked Age, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 711, 713–15, 721–26 (2015).
16. For discussion of the idea of resilience, see Martha Albertson Fineman,
The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 269–73
(2010).
17. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
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some ends, the nature of a firm as an entity distinct from its
owners is important.
The starting point for the discussion is straightforward.
Corporate form is an advantage in raising capital, and the
advantages stem from the separation of ownership and control.18
Legally, the corporation offers unlimited life, limited liability
both for the investor acquiring an equity share and the
entrepreneur undertaking the commercial enterprise, and the
ability to transfer ownership of the shares and/or management
of the company without liquidating the enterprise.19 The growth
of the corporation was thus important for large, complex
undertakings,20 and quite different in important respects from
partnerships or sole proprietorships.21
The principal disadvantage of the corporation also comes
from the separation of ownership and control. 22 Indeed,
corporate form took hold more readily in the United States than
the United Kingdom perhaps because of the latter’s early,
unhappy experiences with corporate entities. 23 Adam Smith
wrote in The Wealth of Nations that the directors of such
companies, “being the managers rather of other people’s money
than of their own,” cannot be expected to “watch over it with the
same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private
copartnery frequently watch over their own. . . . Negligence and
profusion, therefore, must always prevail.” 24 At their worst,
corporations can be “weapons” designed to exploit unwary
18. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law
Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV.
387, 388–93 (2003) (arguing that the ability to lock in investors’ capital was the
primary advantage over other business forms).
19. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or Concession? An Essay on the
History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873, 885 (2000); Thomas S. Ulen, The
Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 320 (1993).
20. Blair, supra note 18, at 398–99.
21. Indeed, most businesses of all kinds were sole proprietorships or
partnerships until at least the middle of the nineteenth century. David Millon,
Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1024 (2013).
22. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 435 (2000); see also 2 ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 741 (R.H.
Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 1976).
23. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles
of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J.
1, 24–25 (2001) (maintaining that the United States led in the dispersion of
ownership and did so in part because of the capital needs of large railroads); id.
at 39–45 (discussing later developments in the United Kingdom).
24. 2 SMITH, supra note 22.
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investors or extend the reach of fraudulent schemes.25
The basic advantage—capital accumulation—and the
disadvantages that come from the separation of ownership and
control do not necessarily indicate very much about corporate
purpose or the role of an entity as a means to those ends. Instead,
as the corporation took hold in the beginning of the twentieth
century, the major discussion concerned corporate size. 26 The
rise of the industrial era marked the emergence of large-scale
organizations that coordinated human activity. 27 Economists,
like Adam Smith, associated the creation of wealth with
specialization and trade; corporations brought that
specialization in-house. John Kenneth Galbraith observed,
however, that large organizations, which established prices and
insured a demand for their products, were “enemies of the
market.” 28 In the view that dominated discussion of the firm
from the beginning of the twentieth century through the end of
the nineteen-seventies, the essential role of the corporation lay
in the role of corporate size in creating distinctive advantages
and risks. Understanding these advantages and the risks
requires seeing the corporation as an institution that stood apart
from the interests of its stakeholders and had importance
greater than the sum of its parts.
A. CORPORATE IDENTITY AND THE SUPPRESSION OF THE PRICE
MECHANISM
The idea of the firm as an entity greater than the sum of its
parts has long been accepted as a defining feature of capitalism.
In 1991, Ronald Coase received the Nobel Prize in Economics,
with one of his two major contributions to the field entitled “The
25. Coffee, supra note 23, at 28 (noting that because of the risks of
corruption, prominent underwriters refused until the end of the nineteenth
century to underwrite the common stock of industrial corporations); see also
Stanton Wheeler & Mitchell Lewis Rothman, The Organization as Weapon in
White-Collar Crime, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1403, 1422–26 (1982) (noting that
“persons who commit offenses under the aegis of an organization are able
thereby to commit crimes of greater sophistication, complexity, and
magnitude”).
26. See Donald J. Smythe, The Supreme Court and the Trusts: Antitrust
and the Foundations of Modern American Business Regulation from Knight to
Swift, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 91 (2005) (describing the interplay between the
growth of corporate size and antitrust regulation at the beginning of the
twentieth century).
27. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 40–41
(Princeton Univ. Press 2007) (1967).
28. Id. at 41. And, in Galbraith’s era, he meant “men.”
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Nature of the Firm.”29 His role in the corporate debate serves as
a touchstone both for understanding the industrial age
corporation at its height and as an inspiration for the
information age theorists who would dismantle it. He wrote
initially as a graduate student in the 1930s in an effort to provide
an economic explanation for the increasing size of organizations.
The paper was largely ignored for the next thirty years, and then
rose to prominence less as an explanation for the phenomena
Coase sought to explain than as an agent of its destruction.30 The
key to the paper’s influence may well be its brevity. Coase would
say in his Nobel Prize acceptance lecture that that his work has
been criticized for its failure to “operationalize” its core insights,
that is, to define the variables that underlie transaction cost
economics in a way that allows them to be quantified and
empirically tested.31 That “failure” may well be the secret of his
success: subsequent scholars can read into the work the
interpretations that advance their own theories. We will do the
same and argue that Coase’s critical insight about the role of
firms fits comfortably with explanations of large corporations at
the height of their influence and the intellectual developments
that mark their decline. “Operationalizing Coase” thus means
identifying what role the suppression of the price mechanism,
the factor he most identifies with the nature of the firm, plays as
that role changes over time. While we make no pretense of
engaging in formal economic modeling, we do emphasize the
importance of singling out the factors that explain the rise of
large business entities at their height and their more recent
decline.
In his initial article, Coase argued that the rise of the large
corporation should be treated as an economic mystery.
Economists after all celebrated the price mechanism, that is,
Adam Smith’s unseen hand coordinating the supply of goods and
services in accordance with market exchanges, as the hallmark
of efficiency. Yet, Coase observed that “the distinguishing mark
of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism.”32 Given
29. Coase, supra note 2. To be sure, Coase was influenced by other
economists. See, e.g., FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT
(Univ. of Chicago Press, Midway Reprint ed. 1985) (1921).
30. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business
Firm: 1880-1960, 95 IOWA L. REV. 863, 869 (2010) (describing Coase’s impact).
31. Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, in NOBEL
LECTURES IN ECONOMIC SCIENCES: 1991–1995, at 11, 18–19 (Torsten Persson
ed., World Scientific Publ’g Co. 1997).
32. Coase, supra note 2, at 389.
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that economists posited that production did not require any
organization at all, why did the firm arise and, indeed, why had
large firms become so central to economic production?
To provide an answer, Coase framed the question in terms
of a comparison between the advantages of the market and use
of the price mechanism versus those of a command and control
system where the entrepreneur owner could simply order the
result. 33 His description of the alternatives—market
transactions or command and control—is remarkably thin.
Coase describes the character of a contract internal to the firm
as one whereby “the factor, for a certain remuneration (which
may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the directions of an
entrepreneur within certain limits.” 34 This description almost
certainly reflects two influences. The first is the contrast
between capitalist markets and socialist economies and it
contains a measure of irony. Coase begins the article observing
that “[t]hose who object to economic planning on the grounds
that the problem is solved by price movements can be answered
by pointing out that there is planning within our economic
system . . . which is akin to what is normally called economic
planning.” 35 This “economic planning” is the boss telling his
employees what to do.36
Second, the dominant management model of the era was
“Fordism,” modeled after Henry Ford’s use of the assembly
line. 37 As a more general term, Fordism has been defined in
terms of the separation of conception from execution, the
substitution of skilled workers with unskilled workers, and the
use of universal machinery to produce one product for mass
markets. 38 As a management principle (often called
“Taylorism”), the idea required management control over labor

33. Id. at 390.
34. Id. at 391 (emphasis omitted). Coase italicized the words “within
certain limits” and added in a footnote that “[i]t would be possible for no limits
to the powers of the entrepreneur to be fixed. This would be voluntary slavery.”
Id. at 391, 391 n.2.
35. Id. at 387–88.
36. Coase explains, “If a workman moves from department Y to department
X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he is ordered
to do so.” Id. at 387.
37. Nancy K. Kubasek et al., Putting Worker-Management Relations in
Context: Why Employee Representational Choice Needs Greater Protection in
Reform of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 53, 59 (1997).
38. CHARLES F. SABEL, WORK AND POLITICS: THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN
INDUSTRY 32–33, 194–95 (1982).
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in the name of efficiency. 39 While Coase does not discuss
management theories per se, he viewed management’s ability to
direct labor as definitional. He accordingly wrote that what
constitutes a firm in practice is tied to the legal relationship
between employer and employee (or “master and servant”) and
that legal relationship involves the duty of the servant to render
personal services to the master and the master’s right to control
the servant’s work.40 Indeed, the employer’s ability to tell the
employee when to work, what work to do, and how to do it
becomes “the dominant characteristic in this relation and marks
off the servant from an independent contractor” as a matter of
law.41
In considering the value of the firm, Coase stresses the need
to deal with uncertainty and (as always for Coase) transaction
costs.42 In this model, the critical role of the firm then becomes
its ability to serve as an alternative to the price mechanism. To
the extent that the use of markets has a high price, perhaps
because of the unpredictability of future events, the firm gives
the entrepreneur greater flexibility. 43 The value of Coase’s
insight, however, does not lie with his specification of how a firm
organizes any particular activity; instead, it is the contrast
between market and non-market transactions and the startling
conclusion, at least for an economist, that even in the productive
realm, non-market organization may be superior. 44 Coase’s
conclusion suggested that the entity as an entity might have
some importance.

39. These ideas are closely associated with Frederick W. Taylor. See, e.g.,
Frederick W. Taylor, Shop Management, in SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 17, 98–
99 (Frederick Winslow Taylor ed. 1947) (“All possible brain work should be
removed from the shop and centered in the planning or laying-out
department.”). For an evaluation of Taylor’s impact, see HARRY BRAVERMAN,
LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 90 (1974) (emphasizing the importance of Taylor’s
principles as a management tool in gaining nearly absolute control over the
labor process).
40. Coase, supra note 2, at 403–04.
41. Id. at 404 (citing FRANCIS R. BATT, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT
6 (1933)).
42. Id. at 394–95, 400–03.
43. Id. at 391 (noting that the longer the contract term, the harder it
becomes to specify what needs to be done).
44. Indeed, Coase addresses only the classical notion of efficiency in the
production of goods and services. See, e.g., id. at 394, 398–99.
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B. THE INDUSTRIAL ERA AND THE ADVANTAGES OF THE FIRM
Coase tried in the thirties to create a schema that could
predict when a firm would find it more useful to bring activities
in-house rather than contract for the same goods and services on
the market. His answer—when the advantages of command and
control outweighed the market—did not give much insight into
the forces that produced the advantages he described. 45 Two
other bodies of work go into those advantages in much greater
detail: those describing the coordination of labor within firms
and those describing a large enterprise’s advantages in
addressing external conditions. The description of the former
comes from John Kenneth Galbraith’s work on The New
Industrial State in the 1960s.46
The rise of large organizations in the twentieth century
marked the rise of what Max Weber termed “bureaucracy” both
within government and within business enterprises. 47 Like
Coase, he assigned considerable credit to hierarchy—to the
creation of a command structure that coordinated activities. 48
Weber, however, gave considerably more weight to the idea of
expertise and to the association of authority with that
expertise.49 Galbraith’s work three decades later explained how
the two came together as the hallmark of large corporations. In
Galbraith’s model, the individual entrepreneur and the allpowerful executive disappear. 50 Institutions, with large
companies primary among them, had become more important
than the individuals who direct them, and the connections
between the company and its top officers central to the
coordination of technocratic enterprises.
45. See, e.g., Robert Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability,
32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 402–03 nn.33–34 (2007) (noting that “[t]ransaction cost
methodology requires the evaluation of relative costs” but that “[t]ransaction
costs are not consistently defined in the literature”); Oliver E. Williamson, The
Economics of Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 3–4 (2005).
46. GALBRAITH, supra note 27.
47. See 3 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 956–963 (Guenther Roth &
Claus Wittich eds., 1968) (1922). Weber also noted a number of the dark sides
of bureaucracy, such as reduced transparency—which permitted those with
expertise to maintain the power that accompanies specialized expertise. See,
e.g., Louis M. Imbeau, Transparency in the Budget Process of a Bureaucratic
Organisation: A Principal-Agent Model of Budgeting, in THE ECONOMICS OF
TRANSPARENCY IN POLITICS 189, 189–90 (Albert Breton et al. eds., 2007)
(discussing Weber’s views on the danger of expertise).
48. See 2 WEBER, supra note 47.
49. See id.
50. See GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 115–22.
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Modern media theory, when applied to organizational
behavior, describes institutions as supplying an identity
associated with a firm that in turn commands loyalty from those
who embrace the identity. 51 Economists George Akerlof and
Rachel Kranton used this idea of identity to examine the ability
of a firm to create employee identification with firm objectives
and values. 52 Workers who think of themselves as insiders
rather than outsiders require less in the way of extra
compensation to produce desired results and become less likely
to game the compensation system that does exist.53 Moreover,
group cohesion increases feelings of loyalty and reduces
turnover. Akerlof and Kranton concluded that “[w]orker
identification may therefore be a major factor, perhaps even the
dominant factor, in the success or failure of organizations.”54
Galbraith’s account of the corporation at mid-twentiethcentury made the same point in explaining corporate success at
the height of the manufacturing era. Written at a point almost
equidistant between Coase and Akerlof and Kranton, Galbraith
found that the principal problem for any organization is how to
coordinate the activities of members. 55 Doing so requires
addressing the issue of motivation. Like Akerlof and Kranton, he
found that both compulsion and pecuniary incentives were not
enough. 56 Instead, the most effective motivation comes from
employees who identify with the goals of the firm and derive
tremendous satisfaction from achieving them or, short of that,
who partially identify with the firm’s objectives and hope to be

51. See, e.g., DONALD HISLOP, KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT IN
ORGANIZATIONS 230 (2013) (describing how the most effective way to deal with
problems such as employee turnover is to develop institutional identity and
employee loyalty and observing that institutional identity that encourages
employees to identify with firm objectives creates stronger loyalty than
instrumental measures such as merit pay or bonuses).
52. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS:
HOW OUR IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELL-BEING 59 (2010).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 176–85.
56. Ironically, given the later emphasis on agency costs, Galbraith observed
that compulsion produced the highest cost to the firm in terms of oversight and
monitoring and pecuniary incentives, such as bonuses tied to production goals,
provided little basis for loyalty and, as Akerlof and Kranton would later observe,
incentives to game the system, requiring that much greater oversight in turn.
See id. at 164–67. For a fuller discussion, see Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The
Evolution of the Modern Corporation: Corporate Governance Reform in Context,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1001, 1040 (2013).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2870076

ARTICLE_CLEAN COPY_MINN_NOV_14.DOCX

2017]

THE DEATH OF THE FIRM

11/15/2016 2:42 PM

1045

able to influence them in a direction more to their liking.57 In
short, Galbraith, too, believed in “identity economics” and found
the firm as entity central to the creation of identity.
Galbraith nevertheless distinguished among different
groups associated with companies. He maintained that
identification with the company affected the productivity of all
employees, though the effect was likely to be least pronounced
among the less skilled. Still, the individual worker came to think
of himself as “an IBM man, a Corning Glass man or a Sears
man.”58 He observed further:
Next, as one moves inward, are foremen and supervisory personnel and
the clerical, sales and other routine white collar personnel. These
merge at their inner perimeter with technicians, engineers, sales
executives, scientists, designers and other specialists who comprise the
technostructure. Beyond these at the center are the executives or
management. As one moves through these inner circles, identification
and adaptation become increasingly important.59

In other words, as employees move up the corporate ladder,
positions require greater expertise and judgment; as the
opportunity for discretionary judgment increases, the difficulty
of specifying outcomes grows and the importance of motivation
increases. Identity—with the corporation and with a
professional role—supplies a significant portion of that
motivation.
Within this schema, Galbraith identified shareholders as
those most motivated by monetary incentives—and least
interested in the health of the company beyond what might be a
very limited investment.60 In contrast, corporate officers of the
postwar era tended to see their role as one of company stewards
who linked particular company objectives to technocratic norms
that made the quality of their stewardship an indication of
professional standing.61 Galbraith observed that while corporate
57. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 207–22.
58. Id. at 188. Akerlof and Kranton add that employees, like enlisted
personnel in the military, may identify more with their unit than with the
enterprise more generally, but that the unit identification can also be a strong
source of motivation. AKERLOF & KRANTON, supra note 52, at 56–57.
59. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 152–53.
60. Id. at 150–51. For a more complex account of shareholder interests,
however, see LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC
(2012).
61. Harwell Wells notes that this idea of stewardship even had a place in
the Harvard Business School’s conception of the Managerial Role. Harwell
Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change, and
the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA.
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officers often did own stock or stock options, and while they often
had access to information from which they could personally
benefit, they rarely acted to advance their individual pecuniary
interests at the expense of the firm—or their professional
standing. 62 Instead, “[p]ower passe[d] down into the
organization,”63 and acting on self-interest was just not what “a
good company man” did.”64
Galbraith attributed the strength of the ethos to group
decision-making and identification. 65 Indeed, he asserted that
the prevalence of group, rather than individual, action “is a
striking characteristic of management organization in the large
corporation.” 66 Galbraith even defended the committee.
Committees were necessary, in part, because the complexity of
the corporation required broad input.67 With group sessions, the
individual’s actions, reasoning, and behavior were subject to
scrutiny.68 Individuals were expected to live up to a high level of
personal honesty, and they benefitted as part of a group, rather
than as individuals competing against each other for promotions
or bonuses. Pay levels, whether generous or not, did not vary
with firm profits69 and the CEO’s income, which was not that
much higher than that of other senior management officials,
paled in comparison with the compensation levels of the twenties
or today. 70 Galbraith concluded that business enterprise in
“modern economic society” could “only be understood as an effort,
J. BUS. L. 305, 323–24 (2013).
62. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 146–48.
63. Id. at 147.
64. Id. at 147–48.
65. Galbraith wrote:
Thus decision in the modern business enterprise is the product not of
individuals but of groups. The groups are numerous, as often informal
as formal, and subject to constant change in composition. Each contains
the men possessed of the information, or with access to the information,
that bears on the particular decision together with those whose skill
consists in extracting and testing this information and obtaining a
conclusion.
GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 80.
66. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 73 (citation omitted).
67. See id. (citing JUSTIN G. LONGNECKER, PRINCIPLES OF MANAGEMENT
AND ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 263 (Charles E. Merrill, 3d ed. 1973)).
68. Id. at 78.
69. Id. at 147.
70. See id. at 138–39 (discussing how lower executive pay tracks to a
commitment to the success of the corporation over self-interest); O’Kelley, supra
note 56, at 1022, 1046 (discussing the relatively high pay of CEOs in the
twenties and today compared to that of their employees).
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wholly successful, to synthesize by organization a group
personality far superior for its purposes to a natural person”—
and it had the advantage of immortality to boot.71
To be sure, the advantages of this system did not come solely
from the strength of individual corporate identities. Instead, it
came from the combination of firm stewardship with something
Galbraith called the “technostructure.” This technostructure
included “all who bring specialized knowledge, talent or
experience to group decision-making.” 72 This group, with its
shared ethos and commitment to technocratic management,
rather than top corporate officials per se, constituted “the
guiding intelligence—the brain—of the enterprise.” 73 While
these corporate groups did bring different perspectives and types
of expertise to bear on individual decisions, they also created
reinforcing cycles that deepened identification with the firm.
Charles O’Kelley explained: “Thus, decisions are made in order
to enhance the ability of technocrats to identify with the firm, to
reward team members who are able to further the goals of the
technocracy, and, if possible, to subtly and incrementally adapt
the corporation to the CEO’s own values.”74
This notion of scientific management had its limitations.
The group did not necessarily seek to maximize short-term
corporate profits. 75 Instead, with closer management
identification with the firm itself, the first order of the day was
the survival of the corporation.76 Safe and dependable earnings
expansion served that end better than risks, which, however
much they promised exceptional returns, could also produce
catastrophic losses. In addition, this group, confident in its own
judgment, sought to insure its own autonomy.77 CEOs did not
have dictatorial power in an era of management by committee,78
but they did enjoy considerable independence from shareholders,
who remained more broadly dispersed than today’s institutional
investors, and from other outside actors.79
71. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 74.
72. Id. at 88.
73. Id.
74. O’Kelley, supra note 56, at 1042.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1041.
77. See id.
78. See GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 70. These limits on the CEO came
from the CEO’s need to defer to those with superior technical expertise. Id. at
72.
79. See O’Kelley, supra note 56, at 1002–03.
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In this system, the firm did become more important than the
individual. Few would confuse the world dominated by
behemoths like General Motors, IBM, or Ma Bell with
entrepreneur-run enterprises such as Ford or Standard Oil of a
half century earlier, or the Steve Jobs–run Apple or Mark
Zuckerberg’s Facebook of more recent times. And with longer
worker tenure in both the senior management and production
ranks, corporate officers identified their own success and wellbeing far more with the health and prestige of their companies
than with their individual bank accounts. It therefore made
sense to bring activities inside the firm to the extent that this
technocratic motivation, which came from the combination of
firm and professional identity, provided greater advantages than
from more contingent arrangements. And with greater firm
investment in workers and a correspondingly greater
commitment to worker tenure, employment became a foundation
for individual security and employee well-being.80 One way of
“operationalizing” Coase therefore becomes the calculus: When
does identification with firm objectives and ethos offer
advantages that outweigh the costs of commitment to a longterm workforce?81
As firms grew, however, and their size in itself contributed
to the impact of these behemoth firms, primary among the
effects was greater insulation from market pressures. This
produced a different body of analysis, emphasizing the risks as
well as the advantages to the public of large organizations.
C. THE RISKS OF LARGE ORGANIZATIONS
Coase, in identifying the advantages of firms, mentioned
several kinds of effects. The first was the ability to command
employees, but the second involved the ability to plan free from
immediate market pressures. 82 Galbraith also mentioned the
advantages large firms have to set prices (often with the tacit
80. See Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property, 53
TULANE L. REV. 697, 701–02 (1979) (“[A]n inference is justified that arbitrators
have both sensed and contributed to the heightened importance of the job
relationship as a focal point of security and standing in society . . . .”).
81. The answer, of course, depends in part on whether the labor market is
tight or slack, and partly on whether the benefits of firm identity and
corresponding worker loyalty justify a commitment to long-term stability in
employment. For a discussion of the propriety of loyalty in the absence of
employer commitment to employees, see David W. Hart & Jeffery A. Thompson,
Untangling Employee Loyalty: A Psychological Contract, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 297
(2007).
82. See Coase, supra note 2, at 390–92.
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agreement of other firms) and to create demand (often through
product design, packaging, and advertising).83 For much of the
twentieth century, debate about corporations involved debate
about their insulation from market forces, not to achieve
competitive advantages in planning for uncertain future events,
but in order to acquire greater control over the events
themselves. 84 Another way to operationalize Coase suggests
that firms continue to grow in size so long as the contribution of
greater size to their ability to control events does not outweigh
the costs. Stated in these terms, size becomes connected to
political and market power rather than production efficiencies.85
With increased growth, corporations became more powerful.
The largest corporations of the industrial era tended either to be
part of cartels such as big steel, big auto, and big oil, or heavily
regulated utilities, such as General Electric (GE) and the
American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T). The
sheer size of the institutions increased their political clout and
their impact on the communities in which they were located.
General Motors layoffs could devastate Detroit and wiping out a
class of shareholders, often employees without diversified
portfolios, could create ripple effects throughout affected
communities.86 The initial responses at the turn of the twentieth
century addressed the power size conferred. 87 The growing
83. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 251–54, 319.
84. Harwell Wells summarized these observations by stating the following:
[Corporations] were unique not just because of their size, but because
they were competing in oligopolistic or highly regulated markets and
were insulated from intensive competitive pressures. Capable of
generating capital internally, they also were independent of capital
markets. Buffered from external controls, the largest firms resembled
independent states: they could command an army of employees,
determine what to produce, set prices, direct scientific progress, decide
which communities received new investment, and even set the rate of
capital expansion.
C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical
Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 102 (2002).
85. See Charles R.T. O’Kelley, Berle and Veblen: An Intellectual Connection,
34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1317, 1339–40 (2011) (quoting THORSTEIN VEBLEN,
ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES: THE CASE
OF AMERICA 220 (A.M. Kelley 1964) (1923)).
86. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 306 (1932) (noting that the “great
associations” of the industrial age “are so different from the small, privately
owned enterprises of the past as to make the concept of private enterprise an
ineffective instrument of analysis”).
87. See Wells, supra note 61, at 316–17 (emphasizing the role of
oligopolistic concentration in increasing firm power).
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influence of monopolies and cartels spurred antitrust measures,
with the aim of recreating competitive markets, and justified the
creation of a more powerful State capable of countering the
growth of private power.88 In the 1930s, concern about corporate
power took a different direction, focusing on the changing nature
of the firm itself. This commentary critiqued the separation of
ownership and control as the hallmark of large corporations, and
the increasing impact of large corporations not just on business
arrangements, but on important aspects of the lives of the
communities they affected. 89 Adolph Berle and Gardiner
Means’s magisterial volume, “The Modern Corporation and
Private Property,” published in 1932, called corporate managers
of this era “princes of industry” and likened their power to the
overseer of a principality.90
Berle and Means argued that, by the Great Depression, the
corporation as entity had taken on a significance that made it
something more than the tools of its owners. They maintained
that the corporations of the era oversaw economic empires that
aggregated capital from widely dispersed sources and used it to
create complex, unaccountable enterprises. 91 Taking together
the corporation’s impact on its shareholders, employees, and the
communities it affected, Berle and Means concluded that
corporations had become “quasi-public” entities akin to
principalities that affected, in one way or another, every
household in America.92
In discussing the separation of ownership and control, Berle
and Means raised two different types of issues. The first involved
the ability of a control block of shareholders to fleece other
shareholders.93 In the decade that preceded Berle and Means’s
88. See HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 374 (1909)
(advocating for the need to break up monopolies through legal and political
means due to their threat to “any thoroughly democratic and constructive
system of municipal economy”).
89. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 5 (noting, however, that many
corporations were not necessarily geographically bound).
90. Id. at 4.
91. Id. at 4–5. Berle observed that corporate managers obtained greater
independence not just from shareholders, but also from creditors. By restricting
stock dividends, the managers could generate additional cash internally for new
investments, limiting their dependence on creditors as well. See ADOLF A.
BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 35–41 (1954).
92. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 4.
93. See id. at 128–218 (arguing that, because the law had gradually reduced
the rights of shareholders, it was questionable whether they could be termed
owners at all.).
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book, stock ownership had increased dramatically, with the
stock market boom of the twenties fueled in part by the increased
participation of small investors. These investors often had
limited voting rights and less control over corporate policies.94
Moreover, during the same period, corporate executives often
commanded outsized salaries with minimal disclosure or
accountability. 95 Indeed, one commentator of the period
observed that “the fat boys, no longer content with their ancient
perquisite of milking the public, are now engaged in the dizzy
and lofty job of squeezing their own shareholders dry!”96 Concern
that managers, who were often controlling shareholders, served
to advance their own ends at the expense of other shareholders
was widely shared, and thought to be one of the principal causes
of the Great Depression.97
The second concern had to do with the impact of large
corporations on communities. Large industrial firms depended
on established supply chains and a large supply of workers.98
This in turn made such companies vulnerable to labor or supply
chain disruptions. 99 A major source of the uncertainty Coase
94. Indeed, Berle and Means devoted nearly a hundred pages to detailing
the legal changes that gave shareholders less corporate power. Id.
95. See, e.g., Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”:
The Fight over Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV.
689, 707–08 (2010).
96. Stuart Chase, Professor Quixote, NATION, Mar. 9, 1927, at 264.
97. Berle and Means commented further that:
The economic power in the hands of the few persons who control a giant
corporation is a tremendous force which can harm or benefit a
multitude of individuals, affect whole districts, shift the currents of
trade, bring ruin to one community and prosperity to another. The
organizations which they control have passed far beyond the realm of
private enterprise—they have become more nearly social institutions.
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 46.
98. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009)
(summarizing literature that describes vertical integration as a response to firm
dependence on supply chains and observing that modern innovative firms no
longer follow the same patterns).
99. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal routinely writes articles today
explaining the difficulty manufacturing companies have in locating such plans
in the United States because of the difficulties of reestablishing supply chains
and skilled labor forces. See, e.g., James R. Hagerty, For U.S. Manufacturing,
Opportunities and Challenges, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/for-u-s-manufacturing-opportunities-and-challenges-1433300938
(emphasizing trained workers, infrastructure, and supply chains); Ted Mann,
Otis Finds ‘Reshoring’ Manufacturing Is Not Easy, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230451870457951943294657
4424; see also Mark Muro, Reshoring: Strong Regions Will Determine Where,
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described involved insuring that supplies and workers would be
available when needed. A solution was the creation of everlarger, vertically integrated entities.100 Berle explained that by
the time of the early thirties, 200 corporations had amassed
wealth equal to almost half the industrial assets of the country,
and the profits generated by these companies had an effect
through their shareholders on perhaps half of the country. 101
The larger the entities, however, the greater their power and
potential impact on the communities in which they were located,
and hence the greater the potential disruptive effects from the
wrong-doing Berle and Means described. 102 Moreover, the
change from entrepreneurial firms to firms characterized by the
separation of ownership and control also meant that community
norms had less impact on owners and managers. 103 An
entrepreneurial owner, for example, might find that if he fleeced
his customers, mistreated his employees, or sold shoddy
products, his personal standing in the community would drop.104
Management committees or a control bloc of shareholders, on the
other hand, were often relatively anonymous and their
membership could change over time, making them that much
less accountable to anyone.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, breaking up these
concentrations of power was the preferred solution. Berle and
Means instead sought to tame them. In their view, this
increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of a relatively
few, unaccountable entities rendered “the corporation an
organization with an impact comparable to the medieval church
or the modern state.”105 They concluded that the power of the
modern corporation and the unaccountability of its managers
How, BROOKINGS: THE AVENUE (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/
blog/the-avenue/2014/10/02/reshoring-strong-regions-will-determine-where
-how.
100. See Gilson et al., supra note 98, at 438–39 (describing industries for
which vertical integration was initially seen as a superior model).
101. See A. A. Berle, Jr., Note, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees:
A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1368 n.8 (1932).
102. See Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 1247, 1290 (2010) (citing BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 352).
103. See Berle, Jr., supra note 101, at 1367–68 (suggesting that, in systems
that emphasize individual ownership, managers are subject neither to market
discipline nor community norms).
104. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?,
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1153 (1932) (arguing that a changing public attitude
about a business’s obligations to the community will lead to changed behavior
in managers).
105. Wells, supra note 102, at 1290.
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“placed the community in a position to demand that the modern
corporation serve not alone the owners or the control but all
society.”106
D. THE TAMING OF CORPORATE POWER
Berle and Means, who emphasized the problems stemming
from the separation of ownership and control, have defined the
corporate governance debate ever since. Ironically, they remain
iconic figures in the area where their work hit an inescapable
dead end: the private law that governs the relationships among
corporate stakeholders. They have been less influential in the
arena they most sought to influence at the time: the role of state
and community in offsetting the accumulation of corporate
power. 107 To operationalize Berle the corporate scholar and
Berle and Means collectively requires asking the question: As
the nature of corporate power shifts, what measures become
necessary to protect the interests of other stakeholders, that is,
how can parity be restored among business, labor, and
community interests?
To answer the question requires separating the two issues
Berle and Means identified: the use of corporate structure to
enrich a control bloc at the expense of customers, workers, and
other shareholders; and the use of corporate structure to
advance the interests of corporate actors at the expense of the
larger community. The classic debate between Berle and law
professor E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. in the pages of the Harvard Law
Review explains the dilemma for systems of private governance.
Berle, concerned about unaccountable control blocs victimizing
other shareholders, argued for stronger fiduciary duties by
corporate officers and directors to maximize shareholder
wealth. 108 In 1932, Dodd, more concerned about corporate
community obligations, challenged the idea that stockholders
should be the “sole beneficiaries of the corporate enterprise,”
preferring broader duties to multiple stakeholders. 109 Berle
objected that the problem was that the “relatively unbridled
scope of corporate management has, to date, brought forward in
the main seizure of power without recognition of responsibility—

106. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 312.
107. Cf. Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle
and Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 19, 20 (1988).
108. See Berle, Jr., supra note 101, at 1367–68.
109. Dodd, Jr., supra note 104, at 1147–48.
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ambition without courage.” 110 To allow corporate managers to
focus solely on corporate earnings might shortchange
community interests, but to allow corporate managers to
advance a broader array of interests meant, as a practical
matter, that they would be subject to no legally enforceable
standards at all. 111 In short, corporate law, limited to private
enforcement of private obligations, offered no real answer to the
full set of challenges corporate power posed.112
Ultimately, what changed the exercise of corporate power
was less a shift in corporate governance or a change in fiduciary
duties, than factors extrinsic to the corporation itself. These
changes ultimately tamed the unaccountable exercise of
corporate power as the corporations themselves retained and
even expanded their dominant position in economic life. Thus,
Berle and Means wrote that the increasing power of corporations
gave rise to increasing public sentiment that those exercising
corporate power “accept responsibility for the well-being of those
subject to the organization, whether workers, investors, or
consumers.” 113 The obligation to others came from the fact of
corporate power, and corporate power came from corporate
insulation from competitive forces and outside control. This
insulation would, at the height of the managerial era, give
corporate managers the latitude to advance a broader set of
interests.114 The more interesting question is why they did so.
The conventional wisdom has three overlapping
components. First, mid-century scholars, Galbraith notably
among them, argued that that “countervailing powers,”
principally unions and the State, limited corporate freedom of
110. Berle, Jr., supra note 101, at 1370.
111. Id. at 1367–68.
112. See Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and
Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (arguing that
shareholder wealth maximization may be the best rule of corporate governance
because “a stakeholder measure of managerial accountability could leave
managers so much discretion that managers could easily pursue their own
agenda, one that might maximize neither shareholder, employee, consumer, nor
national wealth, but only their own”); cf. McDonnell, supra note 6, at 792–93
(arguing that the Hobby Lobby owners are free to pursue their own definitions
of corporate interest because they should not be limited to narrow requirements
to maximize corporate or shareholder wealth).
113. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 310.
114. Cf. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 207–08, 221–22 (noting that the
“mature corporation . . . identifies itself with goals which have, or appear to . . .
have, social purpose”); Wells, supra note 61 (discussing the evolution of
corporate social power).
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action. 115 Galbraith thus argued that the very power of
corporations encouraged the organization of opposition.116
Take unions, for example. In accordance with Galbraith’s
analysis, corporate power both encouraged and made possible
union power. The very dominance of large employers encouraged
organizing efforts to target them. The insulation of these
employers from competitive markets allowed their managers to
engineer union settlements and, as Dodd had argued in the
thirties, increased public pressure on them to do so. Moreover,
postwar corporations, insulated from greater competition, also
decided that a labor truce—and higher worker compensation—
created greater demand for corporate products.117 Given the size
of the unionized plants, the labor rights won in these actions
influenced wages and benefits more generally as the unionized
plants played an outsized role in the labor market. 118 Union
victories in turn reduced employee turnover 119 and union
organization, as it created more cohesive worker groups, also
had the effect of reinforcing employee identification with the
company.120 Union and management interests, both tied to large
organizations, became somewhat less antagonistic.
Second, the State, which increased in power along with
corporations, used regulation of institutions to advance state
interests. In the process, the institution itself became important
to the vindication of public purposes. Galbraith certainly
115. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT
OF COUNTERVAILING POWER 196–200 (1952).
116. See id.
117. Wells observed that:
By the end of that decade, though, the endemic struggle between
capital and labor was replaced, at least in the public eye, by a labormanagement concordat in which corporate managers were left to run
their businesses as they saw fit, and, in return, labor unions received
income and benefits sufficient to carry their members into the middle
class.
Wells, supra note 61, at 322.
118. See John W. Cioffi, Fiduciaries, Federalization, and Finance
Capitalism: Berle’s Ambiguous Legacy and the Collapse of Countervailing
Power, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1081, 1105 (2011) (maintaining that these
reinforcing effects work well in a slack economy, but have destabilizing
inflationary tendencies over time).
119. Union victories both made it harder to fire employees and made jobs
more attractive as they provided benefits, raises, and other advantages that
increased with seniority. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Seniority Rights and
Industrial Change: Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 47 MINN. L. REV. 505, 505–06 (1963).
120. See Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee Interests,
Public Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 952 (1992).
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recognized, for example, that large corporations did not
necessarily welcome union organizers 121 and federal labor
relations laws promoting union organization and collective
bargaining may have been “the most critical, controversial, and
divisive manifestation of governmental intervention to promote
countervailing power.” 122 Other federal laws, perhaps most
notably the Civil Rights Era employment discrimination
statutes, used the regulation of hiring practices in large, private
organizations to model country-wide expectations about
appropriate behavior. Individuals could choose to discriminate;
organizations, particularly large organizations, could not.
The State and large private organizations began to provide
societal benefits in parallel ways. The New Deal initiation of
social security benefits marked a major expansion of the role of
the State in providing a social safety net.123 Still, the expansion
of private pensions, particularly those supplied by large
corporations, established a broad-based complementary system
as an incentive to stay with a single employer. 124 Larger
corporations provided more pension security, and pension
benefits further cemented the importance of firms as institutions
with longer-term time horizons and a larger significance to the
lives of their employees.
This role of large institutions in remaking communities
perhaps reached its height with health care. The United States,
unlike most of the developed world, did not build a public system
of universal health insurance in part because of its reliance on
the private employment system to do so. Many scholars view the
reliance on private plans as an accident of timing—the public
pressure to establish universal insurance came as employers
embraced private benefits as a way around the price controls
established during World War II. 125 The ubiquity of larger
121. See Cioffi, supra note 118, at 1102–03 (noting the contradictions in
Galbraith’s analysis as he simultaneously suggests that countervailing powers
arise spontaneously and that their effectiveness may depend on government
intervention).
122. Id. at 1103–04.
123. See Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income
and the Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1124 (1997) (“[O]ut of 6.5 million people over age sixty-five in
the United States [in the thirties], only 150,000 aged people were receiving
‘industrial and trade-union pensions,’ with possibly an equal number receiving
veterans’ or public retirement system pensions.”).
124. See id. at 1117.
125. See Thomas C. Buchmueller & Alan Monheit, Employer-Sponsored
Health Insurance and the Promise of Health Insurance Reform 3 (Nat’l Bureau
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employers made it possible to envision widespread health
coverage with only limited public provision for the elderly and
the poor. Large corporations within this system collectively
performed societal roles that did not depend on the individual
missions of particular firms.
Third, corporate managers, at least during the period that
ran from the forties through the seventies, did take a broader
view of corporate interests. 126 Here, however, the law’s most
important contribution may have been to stay out of the way.127
A New Jersey decision in the fifties concluded that corporate
managers were free to make charitable contributions where they
could show the “gift tends reasonably to promote the good-will of
the business of the contributing corporation.”128 Other decisions
gave greater weight to shareholder interests. Most decisions,
however, acknowledged the directors’ fiduciary obligations to the
corporation and its shareholders, and as a practical matter gave
corporate managers a wide berth. Dodd’s view in the debate with
Berle appeared to have prevailed.129
E. THE PINNACLE OF FIRM PROMINENCE
The idea of the firm that reigned from the beginning of the
twentieth century through the 1970s was neither constant nor
reified into a fixed legal construct. Instead, it encompassed two
notions that ran through these decades. Both involve the ideas
of institutions as greater than individuals and more than the
sum of their parts. These ideas add content to Coase’s notion of
the firm as a device that suppresses the price mechanism and
does so as a way to coordinate human behavior.
The first idea is the role of identity and loyalty in
coordinating behavior within the firm. With the rise of great
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14839, 2009), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1373348 (“The link between employment and private
health insurance was strengthened during World War II when in 1943 the War
Labor Board ruled that controls over wages and prices imposed by the 1942
Stabilization Act did not apply to fringe benefits such as health insurance.”).
126. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 191–94.
127. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 61, at 311–12 (concluding that the different
eras of corporate theory had little impact on corporate legal developments).
128. A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 585 (N.J. 1953) (citation
omitted).
129. But then Berle changed his position over the course of his lifetime as
well. For a summary of these developments, see Wells, supra note 61. In
contrast, corporate scholars at the turn of the twenty-first century were hailing
the triumph of shareholder supremacy. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2870076

ARTICLE_CLEAN COPY_MINN_NOV_14.DOCX

2017]

THE DEATH OF THE FIRM

11/15/2016 2:42 PM

1058

corporations, the individual entrepreneurs, the Henry Fords or
the John D. Rockefellers, faded in importance.130 In their place,
less recognizable, and perhaps more fungible, corporate
managers embraced the corporate brand and saw their role as
one of stewardship of the institution.131 This stewardship made
the company’s well-being a hallmark of professional success, and
encouraged alignment of individual and corporate values. The
individual gained personal status through identification with
the firm and saw the firm’s well-being as intimately linked with
personal advancement. 132 As modern researchers show, this
conception of the firm provides a better motivator for employee
efforts than monetary rewards, and makes it easier to coordinate
management efforts than more competitive management
systems.133 This strong conception of firm identity, however, also
tends to be an obstacle to more radical restructuring of firm
mission or structure.
This alignment between firm identity and employee
motivation, of course, can exist within any enterprise. The extent
to which it characterizes the employment relationship depends
on bonds of reciprocity. Firm commitment to employees—though
training, opportunities for promotion, secure tenure, and
benefits—encourages greater identification and loyalty. 134 On
the other hand, temporary, routine, or changing activities may
be better supplied through the arm’s length market
transactions. The balance between internal and external
activities is a changing one.135
The second role of the large firm came with the coordination
of external and internal obligations. This, too, involved bonds of
reciprocity. Large firms benefitted most from the suppression of
the price mechanism not with respect to their internal
operations, but from the ability to limit competition from
130. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 115–19.
131. See id. at 122.
132. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS
MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 169 (2011) (describing how firms influence team unity and
bonding by encouraging loyalty to the firm).
133. See, e.g., Michael E. Murphy, Dispelling Tina’s Ghost from the PostEnron Corporate Governance Debate, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63, 105 (2002).
134. See, e.g., Mats Alvesson, Social Identity and the Problem of Loyalty in
Knowledge-Intensive Companies, 37 J. MGMT. STUD. 1101, 1111–15 (2000).
135. For discussion of the changing nature of these calculations, see
BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 63 (discussing the continuing role
of non-monetary incentives in motivating employees), 224–29 (describing the
casualization of work).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2870076

ARTICLE_CLEAN COPY_MINN_NOV_14.DOCX

2017]

THE DEATH OF THE FIRM

11/15/2016 2:42 PM

1059

rivals.136 Thus, Berle and Means and a host of reformers in the
early part of the century emphasized the unaccountability that
came from oligopolistic industries and the dispersion of
shareholders that left managers free to increase their salaries,
risk other people’s money, and fleece the firm’s various
constituents.137 These very same traits—relative freedom from
competitive pressures and from narrow wealth maximization
objectives—contributed to the managerial era that reached its
height in the postwar era.138 In this period, managerial utility,
in the form of personal professional standing and satisfaction,
came from the identification of firm well-being with technocratic
management. Managers—from CEOs to foremen—derived a
greater part of their personal standing from identification with
the firm and they identified the firm’s well-being less with the
short-term bottom line and more with professional standards
and societal objectives.139
In this context, the relationship between external
constraints, such as unions and insulation, and external
pressures, such as market competition, operated in tandem.
Managerial inclination to recognize multiple constituencies was
possible in large part because of insulation from external
threats. Nonetheless, the managerial inclination to promote
broader interests may also have come from greater elite unity in
the postwar era (management and State were inclined to see
their interests as aligned to a greater degree than today), and
from the subordination of individual perspectives and incentives
to a group dynamic. This group dynamic selected for team
managers, rather than individualists, and produced a shared
decision-making process that moderated extreme views.140 Both
encouraged commitment to distinctive firm identities and
alignment of these identities with broader societal interests.
Unlike the managers of the twenties or the nineties, these
captains of industry did not amass extraordinary fortunes,
though they did quite well. 141 Perhaps more importantly, the
136. Indeed, unionization and full employment policies in the postwar era
ultimately gave workers more bargaining power within firms even as the firms
of the postwar era gained greater insulation from competition from other
companies. See GALBRAITH, supra note 115, at 121–23.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 111–113.
138. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 145–47, 274–81.
139. See id. at 159–61.
140. See id. at 96.
141. See Claudia Goldin & Robert A. Margo, The Great Compression: The
Wage Structure in the United States at Mid-Century, 107 Q.J. ECON. 1, 16–19
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corporate leaders of this era, unlike those of the twenties or the
nineties, identified to a greater degree with their communities
and their employees.142
In both of these ways, the idea of the firm as greater than
the individuals who comprised it contributed to the coordination
of relationships within the firm, and the relationships between
firm, state, and community interests. The law in turn responded
by building high marginal tax rates, securities disclosure and
other regulations, and health care, civil rights, and other worker
protections into the new foundation. The firm as an entity that
provided security and stability and advanced interests greater
than the sum of its parts became central to the life of the nation.
II. THE DEATH OF THE FIRM
If the first seven decades of the twentieth century marked
the rise of the firm as an institution greater than the sum of its
parts, the last part of the twentieth century has marked its
dismantling. Corporate behemoths exemplified American
prosperity in the immediate postwar era; they were less nimble
in facing global competition at the end of the century. The
intellectual cohesiveness of American elites in the immediate
postwar era that contributed to the greater alignment of
management and labor, public and private interests gave way to
renewed ideological division. Central to these changes was the
reconceptualization of the firm, from an entity greater than the
sum of its parts to the tool, if not play-toy, of a revitalized group
of entrepreneurs.143 In the process are two central ironies. The
attack on the firm was aimed not on large corporations’ multiple
weaknesses in entering a new, more competitive era, but on
what had been its strengths. And the attack did not reject the
seminal insights of Coase or Berle and Means. Instead, it
embraced and reinterpreted them.

(1992).
142. See, e.g., Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern
Corporation, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 311, 314 (1957); see also Mark S. Mizruchi &
Daniel Hirschman, The Modern Corporation as Social Construction, 33
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1065, 1094 (2010) (arguing that the corporate leaders of the
era showed greater concern for the communities where they were
headquartered).
143. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2500
(2005) (describing nexus-of-contracts theory by stating that “[m]anagers and
shareholders get to play; no one else does”).
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A. THE NEXUS-OF-CONTRACTS AND AGENCY-COST THEORY
While we now think of Coase’s “The Nature of the Firm” as
one of his two most important contributions to economic thought,
leading ultimately to a Nobel Prize in 1991,144 economists paid
relatively little attention to the piece at the time of its
publication. 145 Instead, Coase’s article became far more
influential only after its embrace—and reinterpretation—by
nexus-of-contract scholars decades later. 146 Coase had clearly
distinguished between a firm’s external affairs, characterized by
markets, and its internal affairs, with their supersession of the
price mechanism.147 The later scholars who would create the law
and economics literature that has dominated corporate theory
over the last forty years recharacterized Coase’s insight. They
argued the firm could be best understood as “a nexus of
contracts” and that both external and internal affairs involved
market-driven contracts; they were just different kinds of
contracts produced by different types of market forces.148
Two economists, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz,
provided the initial reconstruction. 149 They referred back to
neoclassical theories of the firm.150 These theories had focused
primarily on returns to scale that compared, for example, the
individual dressmaker to the clothing factory. 151 Both the
involvement of multiple employees performing specialized tasks
and the investment in expensive machinery produce returns to
scale, which in turn make the processes of securing adequate
supplies and selling the finished products more complex, 152
justifying the growth of the organization coordinating the
activities.153
Coase’s insight had been that these firms managed the
coordination involved in these more complex organizations
through something other than price; Alchian and Demsetz
objected that the problems of coordination involved something
144. Coase, supra note 31.
145. Ulen, supra note 19, at 301–02.
146. Ulen characterized it as a “reworking.” Id. at 310. In so doing, Ulen was
referring, in particular, to Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
147. Ulen, supra note 19, at 310.
148. Id. at 319.
149. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 146, at 794.
150. Id. at 781–85.
151. See id. at 784.
152. See Ulen, supra note 19, at 305.
153. See id. at 302.
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more than simply the substitution of employer direction for
contract terms. Instead, they observed that what the firm did
was to assemble teams of workers who needed to work together
to produce the desired output and production teams inevitably
produced shirking—some team members would invariably work
harder than others in a system in which it was impossible to
determine whose input contributed what to net value.154 Alchian
and Demsetz argued that firms solved the problem through the
entrepreneur’s role as a “residual claimant.” 155 The
entrepreneur serves as a monitor who supervises the team to
insure that no one shirks. The entrepreneur pays the team
members a fixed price, which restricts the employees’ jockeying
for positions against each other,156 and keeps the residual profit
left from team efforts, which creates an incentive to guard
against shirking. 157 In effect, Alchian and Demsetz’s analysis
reintroduced price mechanisms within the firm. They
characterized the firm’s internal contracts as ones in which the
entrepreneur had an incentive to monitor in return for the
ability to maximize residual value, and the employees agreed to
work for a fixed price subject to such monitoring.158
154. Id. at 310. Robert Flannigan described shirking as follows:
Generally, shirking means reduced effort expenditure. In many
instances, shirking is not legally actionable at all. For many tasks,
there is a band of effort between maximal and minimal effort that
remains contractually undefined and therefore subject to unilateral
variation by the agent. That is, workers have a degree of latitude in the
performance of their work. This band or range of discretionary effort
typically exists because of information and monitoring weaknesses that
prevent more precise specification and enforcement of effort levels. . . .
Principals normally prefer that their agents operate at or near the
maximal level. Agents may prefer to operate near the minimal level.
Within any given band of effort, the equilibrium effort level will be
determined by the commitment or enthusiasm of the agent as
influenced by the incentives offered by the principal.
Flannigan, supra note 45, at 397.
155. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 146, at 782–83.
156. Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout explain that if all employees are simply
paid a flat rate, the incentive to shirk increases. If, instead, each employee is
paid after the fact in accordance with his or her contributions, the problem of
rent seeking will increase; that is, of employees seeking to maximize their share
through behavior that may undermine others and impose additional costs. See
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 266 (1999).
157. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 146, at 781.
158. Like Coase, Alchian and Demsetz drew no distinction between an initial
entrepreneur like Henry Ford and later corporate managers who come and go
without long term identification with the firm. See Charles R. T. O’Kelley,
Coase, Knight, and the Nexus-of-Contracts Theory of the Firm: A Reflection on
Reification, Reality, and the Corporation as Entrepreneur Surrogate, 35
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This analysis reconciled Coase’s transaction cost insights
(specifying individual contracts for team units engaging in
ongoing production may be costly and inefficient) with the nexusof-contract theories central to modern corporate theory. It
narrowed Coase’s concern with uncertainty from a broad range
of issues that include changing consumer tastes, available
supplies, and labor conditions to a relatively narrow focus on
shirking. It also validated the entrepreneur/owner’s dominant
position in the firm. Most fundamentally, however, it eliminated
the developments of the preceding forty years. The idea of firm
identity providing motivation for employee efforts disappeared
from consideration. So, too, did the notion that relationships
within a firm depend on something different from relationships
outside it. Alchian and Demsetz took Coase’s idea of suppression
of the price mechanism, which opened the door to consideration
of alternative forms of human motivation, and used it to validate
narrow self-interest. The result presented a fundamental
challenge to the importance of the firm itself.
B. THE ASSAULT ON THE FIRM
Alchian and Demsetz, in emphasizing the risk of shirking,
focused attention on an issue that Coase had not made central
to his analysis: the separation of ownership and control. Alchian
and Demsetz, after all, posited that the solution to the problem
of corporate organization lay with owners’ ability to monitor and
the incentive that their retention of the corporate residual gave
them to do so. 159 This incentive disappears, however, if those
receiving the corporate residual (the owner/shareholders) are
not those responsible for the monitoring (the executives). Law
and economics scholars came to call this problem “agency
costs.”160
Coase had not addressed the issue. He described an
“entrepreneur” who controlled the company and could be
expected to oversee employees.161 Instead, Berle, and Berle and
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247, 1262–64 (2012).
159. While many people assume that shareowners “own” corporations, firms
employ a variety of ownership structures that suggest various possible
meanings (and multiple groups) associated with the idea of ownership. See Lynn
A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1189, 1190–92 (2002).
160. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 308–10 (1976).
161. See O’Kelley, supra note 158, at 1248, 1250 (stating that Coase asserted
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Means together, had galvanized discussion of these issues. Berle,
a corporate lawyer, had seen the shenanigans (and often
outright fraud) of the twenties, when companies diluted the
value of common stock, effectively fleecing shareholders, or took
“heads I win, tails you lose” risks with publicly traded companies
that left shareholders holding the bag for ill-advised ventures.
Rather than see corporate owners as the solution, he distrusted
them. 162 The agency-cost theorists needed to rewrite Berle as
fundamentally as they had reinterpreted Coase—and they did.
When the corporate governance debate resumed in the
seventies, the corporation no longer symbolized the
concentration of unaccountable power in the hands of a few.
Instead, the new concern was complacency. Charles O’Kelley
writes that the reality of the mature corporation “was not risktaking and swashbuckling leadership by individualistic CEOs.
Rather, planning and collective decision making by experts was
the key to survival and success.”163 The new theorists of the firm
argued that managers had become too fat and happy. Instead of
using corporate assets to their own ends by engaging in risky or
unwise ventures, they failed to take risks that might benefit
shareholders, particularly if such risks threatened their own (or
in some cases their employees’) comfortable sinecures. 164 The
problem was not that they failed to look out for the corporate
entities’ interests—in the sense of longer-term interests
associated with the firm; it was that they were too eager to do
so—at the expense of the shareholders’ prospects for short-term
returns.165
that the firm depended on the entrepreneur, its “distinct central actor”). Coase’s
failure to mention Berle is itself interesting. Some scholars have suggested that
it reflects the balkanization of academic disciplines in that era. Berle was a law
professor, Coase an economist. Berle’s co-author, Means, was, however, an
economist, though they wrote more for legal and policy audiences than a more
technical academic one. See Wells, supra note 61, at 307. Of course, Coase was
a graduate student in economics in London at the time he conceived of the
paper, and he may simply not have been aware of Berle and Means’s work.
Another possibility, however, is that he thought of the nature of his inquiry as
fundamentally different. Coase, after all, sought to explain the advantages of
large corporations in coordinating production. Berle and Means addressed the
threat large corporations posed to interests that had relatively little to do with
production.
162. Though as we noted above, Berle and Dodd’s views both changed over
time. See supra discussion at note 129.
163. O’Kelley, supra note 56, at 1005.
164. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 160, at 312.
165. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain
in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11, 30 (1986) (noting “basic tension[s]
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Empirical findings by scholars sympathetic to the new
theories provided support for their conclusions. They found, for
example, that CEOs tended to resist takeover bids, even when
the acquirers offered a substantial premium. 166 The CEOs
further favored corporate acquisitions that did not necessarily
increase corporate valuation.167 These studies also showed that
when CEOs enjoyed a substantial ownership stake in the
company, their behavior changed—making them more willing to
entertain hostile bids or to resist acquisitions unlikely to produce
a quick payoff.168
The new generation of corporate theorists again saw this
very different problem as arising from the separation of
ownership and control. 169 The solution, however, was not to
reinforce Berle and Means’s call for greater judicial or
government oversight. Instead, their solutions would be to bring
back the price mechanism both within the firm and without. To
do so, they did not just inveigh against the corporation as a
fiction that could and should be ignored. 170 They ultimately
sought to reduce the entity to no more than a vehicle to facilitate
market exchanges.171
Economists Michael Jensen and William Meckling fired off
between managers and shareholders,” including managerial preferences
“biased in favor of growth over profitability”); Comment, The Attorney-Client
Privilege in Shareholders’ Suits, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 318 (1969)
(“Management . . . is encouraged to represent interests broader than those of
the shareholders or any group of shareholders—interests which include those
of the public and the labor force.”).
166. Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Corporate Finance, the Theory
of the Firm, and Organizations, 12 J. ECON. PERS. 95, 101 (1998); see also Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737,
747 (1997) (discussing current literature regarding managers’ views towards
takeovers).
167. Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 166; see also Schleifer & Vishny, supra
note 166, at 746–47 (observing that managers often chose acquisitions that
served management objectives even if they lowered firm valuation).
168. Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 166.
169. See, e.g., FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1 (1991) (advancing the idea that “investors are
‘powerless’” because managers control the firm, and can control how much
investors know about the firm); FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW (Roberta
Romano ed., 1993) (collecting writings discussing agency problems).
170. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 160, at 310–11.
171. Jensen and Meckling thus defined the private corporation or firm as
“simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting
relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible
residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can
generally be sold without permission of the other contracting individuals.” Id.
at 311 (emphasis omitted).
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an influential salvo in this effort soon after Alchian and
Demsetz.172 They seconded Alchian and Demsetz’s findings that
the separation of ownership and control created monitoring
problems, which they termed “agency costs.”173 They observed,
however, that if this apparent conflict of interest were in fact
insurmountable, no rational shareholder would buy stock.
Instead, they argued that agency costs were ubiquitous. The
conflicts of interest between management and shareholders, for
example, also existed between management and bondholders.
The financial composition of the firm could therefore be
explained in terms of the optimal tradeoff among these types of
costs and their associated risks. In explaining this process (and
incorporating it within the nexus-of-contracts approach), Jensen
and Meckling went to great lengths to emphasize that the
corporation as entity was not in any way special:
Viewing the firm as the nexus of a set of contracting relationships
among individuals also serves to make it clear that the personalization
of the firm implied by asking questions such as “what should be the
objective function of the firm”, or “does the firm have a social
responsibility” is seriously misleading. The firm is not an individual. It
is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in which
the conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may “represent”
other organizations) are brought into equilibrium within a framework
of contractual relations. In this sense the “behavior” of the firm is like
the behavior of a market; i.e., the outcome of a complex equilibrium
process. We seldom fall into the trap of characterizing the wheat or
stock market as an individual, but we often make this error by thinking
about organizations as if they were persons with motivations and
intentions.174

This denial of the importance of the firm as an entity served
several purposes. It reinforced Alchian and Demsetz’s conclusion
that the focus should be on the incentive effects of contracts
within the firm rather than characterization of the firm’s
operations in non-market terms. To the same end, it rejected
Coase’s distinction between the firm’s external and internal
relationships. Instead, within the nexus-of-contracts model, the
conception of firm boundaries became meaningless and it thus
made “little or no sense to try to distinguish those things which
are ‘inside’ the firm (or any other organization) from those things
that are ‘outside’ of it.”175 Recasting the firm this way made it
172. Id.
173. Indeed, this was the title of their article: Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Id. at 305.
174. Id. at 311 (emphasis omitted).
175. Id.
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possible to explain how market discipline, rather than the
suppression of the price mechanism, explained firm structure.
Jensen and Meckling wrote that analysis decrying the
separation of ownership and control “is equivalent in every sense
to comparing a world in which iron ore is a scarce commodity
(and therefore costly) to a world in which it is freely available at
zero resource cost” and then concluding that the first world is
“non-optimal.”176 They dismissively termed this line of reasoning
the “Nirvana” form of analysis and attributed the “Nirvana”
reference to Coase himself.177
C. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND MANAGEMENT INCENTIVES
Legal scholars embraced the nexus-of-contracts approach to
argue that all that was necessary was to get the law out of the
way so that the market could perform its magic.178 Within this
framework, the firm itself and, indeed, obligations to the firm as
an entity and the firm’s obligations outside of voluntary
contracts became meaningless. Eisenberg concluded that “at
bottom the nexus-of-contracts conception is not a theory of the
firm: It is a theory of why there are no firms”; a conclusion that
conflicts with Coase, Berle and Means, and “reality as it is
normally understood.”179
As these scholars wrote, however, corporate markets
themselves were changing. In another era, changes such as
dramatic increases in executive compensation might have been
cause for concern. 180 Instead, this new generation of scholars
became cheerleaders for critical moves away from the cautious
managerial era in which executives identified with multiple firm
constituencies and arguably the firm itself. Instead, multiple
176. Id. at 328.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 169, at 15 (“The
normative thesis of the book is that corporate law should contain the terms
people would have negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at arm’s length for
every contingency sufficiently low.”); see also Millon, supra note 21, at 1025–34
(summarizing developments).
179. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus of
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 832 (1999).
180. See, e.g., MICHAEL PERINO, THE HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET: HOW
FERDINAND PECORA’S INVESTIGATION OF THE GREAT CRASH FOREVER CHANGED
AMERICAN FINANCE 142–66 (2010) (concluding that one of the most startling
revelations to come from the Pecora Commission hearings was the size of the
compensation packages senior banking executives received); Wells, supra note
61, at 319–20 (observing that at the height of the Great Depression, many
questioned the morality of outsized corporate compensation on any basis).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2870076

ARTICLE_CLEAN COPY_MINN_NOV_14.DOCX

2017]

THE DEATH OF THE FIRM

11/15/2016 2:42 PM

1068

forces institutionalized the “death of the firm” by reducing the
multiple purposes identified with business entities to short-term
shareholder value.
First, corporate compensation packages changed to
emphasize stock options. 181 Law and economics scholars
celebrated the move as a way to better align management and
shareholder interests.182 Favorable tax treatment of the options
increased the incentives to use them.183 So, too, did the fact that
under the accounting standards of the time, the options did not
have to be expensed, which effectively disguised what were in
fact large increases in executive compensation.184 Between 1980
and 1994, stock option grants rose by 683%, with the average
grant to the top executive rising from $155,000 to $1.2 million.185
Second, the market for corporate control flourished in the
eighties. During that period, one-half of publicly traded
corporations received tender offers, many of them hostile. 186
Corporate theorists argued that the takeover market would
police management; CEOs who failed to maximize corporate
opportunities would find themselves to be the subject of takeover
actions by those who thought they could better optimize firm
value. 187 The increase in takeover bids 188 had two reinforcing
181. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 320–21 (2012).
182. See, e.g., Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership and Market
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 311–12 (1988); David
I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal
Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 611, 617–18 (2011) (“Clearly, long-term, equitybased compensation can play a role in shaping managerial incentives that
straight salary cannot.”).
183. Dallas, supra note 181, at 320.
184. Id.
185. Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate
Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1378 (2002).
186. Mark L. Mitchell & J. Harold Mulherin, The Impact of Industry Shocks
on Takeover and Restructuring Activity, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 199 (1996).
187. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm,
88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 295 (1980) (arguing that the viability of a “large
corporation with diffuse security ownership” can be explained by the policing of
market forces within and outside the firm, “with the market for outside
takeovers providing discipline of last resort”); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient
Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of
Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9 (1978) (“[I]nefficient performance by
management is reflected in share price thus making the corporation a likely
candidate for a takeover bid. Since a successful takeover bid often results in the
displacement of current management, managers have a strong incentive to
operate efficiently and keep share prices high.”).
188. See David R. Meals, CEO & Employee Pay Discrepancy: How the
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effects. If managers resisted bids that shareholders favored, it
reinforced the conviction that shareholder and manager
interests diverged, increasing the risk of shareholder activism
designed to undermine management control. 189 At the same
time, as stock options became a larger component of corporate
compensation packages, it also made managers more focused on
stock price, both because they benefitted from share increases
and because low stock prices made it more likely that the
company would become a takeover target.190
Third, overall executive compensation increased, whether
premised on base salaries or incentive pay, and became more
steeply hierarchical. The ratio between CEO and average worker
compensation changed from 20.3 in 1965 to 28.5 in 1978 to 55.9
in 1989 to 106.9 in 1999.191 By 2013, the pay ratio between CEOs
and average wage workers was 331:1 and the pay ratio between
CEOs and minimum wage workers was 774:1. 192 While the
greater use of stock options constituted the major shift, 193
salaries increased as well, often in accordance with reductionist
merit pay regimes that intensified competition among managers
and created greater disparities even among a firm’s top
executives.194 Between 1993 and 2014, the percentage of CEO
compensation attributable to incentive pay increased from
Government’s Policies Have Encouraged the Gap, 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP
& L. 297, 307 (2013) (“[I]n the mid-1980s . . . [a]s a result of court decisions,
legal entitlement to approve hostile takeovers shifted from a firm’s shareholders
to its management and board of directors. . . . At about the same time there was
a push for pay-for-performance by big institutional investors that caused a
dramatic increase in the use of stock options and restricted stock in CEO pay
packages.”).
189. See Dallas, supra note 181, at 320.
190. Id. at 320–21; see also Fischel, supra note 187, at 5 (“The lower the
market price of the securities . . . the more attractive the firm is to outsiders
with the ability to take the firm over.”).
191. LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA, 2000–
2001, at 211 (2001).
192. Executive Paywatch: High-Paid CEOs and the Low-Wage Economy,
AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/Paywatch-2014 (last visited
Nov. 11, 2016).
193. Executives also faced greater risk of dismissals if stock earnings did not
increase. See Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns
of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
677, 695 (2011) (indicating that CEO terminations can be linked to share price
performance).
194. For a discussion of the move toward incentive pay, see MICHAEL B.
DORFF, INDISPENSABLE AND OTHER MYTHS: WHY THE CEO PAY EXPERIMENT
FAILED AND HOW TO FIX IT 78–79 (2014) (discussing assumptions that
incentives would spur better performance).
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thirty-five percent to eighty-five percent.195 And together with
both the greater risk of takeovers and the winner-take-all
mentality of executive compensation, management tenure
decreased.196 Larry Ribstein described the emergence of a new
breed of executives who are the “hyper-motivated survivors of a
highly competitive tournament.”197 These executives, socialized
to believe that their out-sized compensation packages are a
measure of their worth, have “the proven ability to make money
while putting on a veneer of loyalty to the firm.”198
Cumulatively, these changes in fact created a closer
alignment between CEO and shareholder perspectives. Both saw
the firm as a source of profit.199 Both linked firm health to share
price and had incentives to do so. Shareholders (at least in
theory) celebrated executives’ willingness to take greater risks,
in part because they most typically held their individual shares
as part of a mutual fund or other collective investment device
designed to diversify investment risk; today’s silent majority
shareholders are more likely than in the twenties and thirties to
be institutional investors rather than individuals with their life
savings at risk.200 Executives, spurred on by stock options and
merit pay incentives, measured their success (or failure) in terms
of short-term fluctuations in share price.201 By the end of the
1990s, corporate officers and directors had adopted measures,
such as “poison pill” provisions, that tamed the 1980s’ market for
corporate control; yet, the changes attributable to greater use of
stock options, increased overall compensation, and the
tournament mentality that took hold in the executive ranks
remained. 202 Whereas the law and economics scholars had
195. Lynn A. Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral
Consequences of “Pay for Performance,” 39 J. CORP. L. 527, 533 (2014).
196. Between 2000 and 2011, CEO tenure declined from about ten years to
8.4. Average Tenure of CEOs Declined to 8.4 Years, the Conference Board
Reports, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/news
-releases/average-tenure-of-ceos-declined-to-84-years-the-conference-board
-reports-147152135.html. With the economic recovery, turnover may be
decreasing.
197. Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud:
A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2002).
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 9, at 721 (noting that not all shareholders
want immediate profit maximization; some may want to benefit human welfare
through “very large-scale, very long-term enterprises”).
200. Shareholders nonetheless are a diverse lot with varied motivations. Id.
at 721–22.
201. See Dallas, supra note 181; Millon, supra note 21, at 1040.
202. See Stout, supra note 9, at 711–13 (“Toward the end of the twentieth
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viewed perks such as use of the corporate jet as examples of a
reallocation of shareholder assets to management, the new
generation of scholars was more likely to view the increase in
compensation as the product of a competitive market that served
shareholder interests.203
In these calculations, the firm as entity, with longer term or
more broadly defined interests, fades from view.204 The result,
however, is not some type of shareholder primacy in which
majority shareholders assert greater control over the
company.205 Instead, the firm becomes something closer to what
Berle feared: the plaything of controlling owners, directors or
managers.
D. THE REDEFINITION OF CORPORATE PURPOSE
The economic analysis of the seventies and eighties
combined with a new wave of corporate law scholarship and a
more dynamic stock market to redefine corporate purpose. In
accordance with the new analysis, the firm as an ideal that has
value on its own terms disappears. In its place comes a
reductionist notion of relationships—the firm becomes a vehicle
for maximizing shareholder investments and short-term share

century, however, American public companies began to change. . . . [S]hare price
became a popular metric and stock options the favorite form of compensation
. . . . Directors and executives now often run public companies with a single goal
in mind: maximizing shareholder value.”).
203. Indeed, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman argued that
shareholder primacy marked “[t]he [e]nd of [h]istory for [c]orporate [l]aw.”
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 129, at 440. They explained that academic,
business, and governmental elites shared a consensus that
ultimate control over the corporation should rest with the shareholder
class; the managers of the corporation should be charged with the
obligation to manage the corporation in the interests of its
shareholders; . . . and the market value of the publicly traded
corporation’s shares is the principal measure of its shareholders’
interests.
Id. at 440–41.
204. What did not happen, however, was an increase in the rights of
shareholders to control management. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply, Letting
Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1813 (2006) (advocating
greater shareholder power to amend the corporate charter or change the state
of incorporation); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise,
93 VA. L. REV. 675, 679–94 (2007) (documenting unsuccessful challenges to
corporate management from 1996 to 2005).
205. Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on “Shareholder Primacy” 6 (Univ. of Cal.,
L.A. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-04, 2011),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1763944.
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values become the measure of success.206
To examine the limitations of this model, it is necessary to
go back to the questions that Coase and Berle and Means posed
initially. For Coase, the secret to the firm lay with the
suppression of the price mechanism. Eighty years later,
management studies emphasize the same thing Coase did—
motivation tied to firm identity is a more powerful motivator
than price—though for reasons that transcend the ability to
command employees directly.207
For Berle and Means, the meaning of the firm lay not just
with the role of the entity in directing its employees, but the
obligations of the corporation to the broader community,
including other stakeholders.208 These obligations came from the
nature of the firm itself as a powerful actor in shaping
communities. With globalization, more competitive markets,
more intense ideological divisions, and the resurgence of class
differences, however, firms do not play the same roles in their
communities as they did in the beginning of the century and they
do not depend to the same degree on the well-being of their
communities.209
To deal with these changes, therefore, it is necessary to
rethink the nature of the firm in the three roles it has played
over the course of the twentieth century. First is the reidentification of the risks: Where does unaccountable power
reside today? Second is the question of the good: Has the loss of
firm as motivator become an obstacle to more cohesive and
productive workplaces? Third are the ugly issues that remain: If
the firm no longer serves societal interests in individual security
and community membership, what should take its place?
206. See Vermeulen, supra note 15, at 714 (noting that current firm “culture
is characterized by a short-term mentality that often leads to stricter control
mechanisms on corporate executives and demands for increased dividends and
stock buybacks”).
207. See Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1717, 1751 (2006) (discussing the relationship between trust,
loyalty, and reciprocity); Stout, supra note 205 (arguing against a “shareholder
primacy” rule and discussing several theories suggesting that price motivation
is not in shareholders’ best interest).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 105–106.
209. Of course, some large employers continue to have a disproportionate
impact on some communities. Compare DAN DIMICCO, AMERICAN MADE: WHY
MAKING THINGS WILL RETURN US TO GREATNESS 3 (2015) (boasting of avoiding
layoffs while CEO of Nucor, a large American steel company), with William
Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2014,
http://www.hbr.org/2014/09/profits-without-prosperity (describing role of Wall
Street in prompting plant closings).
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III. BACK TO THE FUTURE
The firm is dead. That is, the nearly century-long arc that
saw the rise of the large American corporation, its dominance
within American communities, and its emergence as a co-equal
partner with Big Government and Big Labor has reached its end.
To be sure, corporations and firms of various sizes and structure
remain. 210 They do not, however, play the same role in
assembling and motivating labor or coordinating commercial
and civic well-being. In addition, while corporate excess and
malfeasance persist, the sources of the problem—and their
solutions—will not be the same. 211 It is accordingly time to
reckon with the death of the firm, as the Coasean,212 Berlean,213
Galbraithian 214 firm has been understood over the course of
much of the twentieth century, and to consider what part of its
functions need to be replicated elsewhere.
This Part will address the two topics carrying through this
article. First, we will discuss Coase’s insight about the
210. Major manufacturing firms—machinery, automakers, and extractive
operations—still exist, of course. However, these sectors now only employ about
twenty percent of U.S. workers. Alvaro Santos, Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform,
and Economic Development, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 43, 91 (2009). Furthermore,
[i]n the 1990s, the percentage of large firms in the manufacturing
sector dropped considerably while the share of microenterprises
surged. . . . The number of medium-sized and small firms also declined
considerably. While the share of large firms dropped from 1.5% to 0.9%,
microenterprises grew from 86.9% to 92.6%.
Id. at 91 n.209 (citing Enrique de la Garza Toledo, Estructura Industrial y
Condiciones de Trabajo en la Manufactura, in LA SITUACIÓN DEL TRABAJO EN
MÉXICO, 2003, 251, 253–54 (Enrique de la Garza & Carlos Salas eds., 2004)).
The microenterprises tend to grow into much larger entities, get acquired by
larger entities, or go out of business. The result, overall, contributes to labor
insecurity. See discussion infra note 237.
211. Indeed, a full discussion of the new sources of misfeasance would
require a substantial discussion of the financial sector. See, e.g., Lazonick, supra
note 209 (noting that since the late 1970s, a “downsize-and-distribute regime of
reducing costs and then distributing the freed-up cash to financial interests,
particularly shareholders[,] . . . has contributed to employment instability and
income inequality”).
212. In the sense of Coase’s initial article exploring the firm’s suppression of
the market mechanism in favor of internal markets. See supra text
accompanying notes 29–36.
213. In the sense of Berle’s and Berle and Means’s classic works from the
twenties and thirties exploring the concentration of power that made the abuses
leading to the Great Depression possible. See supra text accompanying notes
95–97, 105–106.
214. In the sense of Galbraith’s chronicle of the distinctive features of firm
management during the managerial era. See supra text accompanying notes
55–74.
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suppression of the price mechanism in the context of human
motivation and ask what remains about the role of firm identity
in motivating behavior. We will argue that both management
and labor have more tenuous connections with their places of
employment than they did in the middle of the twentieth century
and that the reinforcing roles of firm identity and employee
loyalty now persist primarily in distinct niches that characterize
the minority of employment relationships.215 The role of firm as
entity has accordingly become less important in either
motivating management or securing employee stability. It
cannot therefore be a reliable foundation for extending public
benefits such as health care or securing public purposes such as
non-discriminatory employment policies.216
Second, we will consider Berle’s concern about the impact of
corporations on polities and argue that with the death of the firm
or, more specifically, the end of the insulation from market
competition that large corporations enjoyed, that relationship
needs to be re-examined. The managerial era involved a publicprivate partnership that conferred benefits on firms premised on
the presumption that would serve public as well as private ends.
The end of this relationship and of the assumptions on which it
was based requires re-examination not just of corporate
obligations, but of public ones.
Third, we will consider the question of abuse of power in the
new era. Both the reinterpretation of Coase in the agency-cost
literature and Berle and Dodd’s various positions in their iconic
debate involved the conflicts of interest that arose from the
separation of ownership and control. We will consider the risks
215. See Declining Employee Loyalty: A Casualty of the New Workplace,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 9, 2012), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn
.edu/article/declining-employee-loyalty-a-casualty-of-the-new-workplace/
(stating that relationships with organizations are getting weaker, and some
people believe that “company loyalty is dead”).
216. Gerald F. Davis, How Financial Markets Dissolved the Society of
Organizations, RASSEGNA ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA 13, 19 (2012)
http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/gfdavis/Papers/davis_12_RIS.pdf (“Large-scale
employers that provided job security, career mobility through job ladders, and
generous health and retirement benefits seem to have been artifacts of the
corporate-industrial age in the US.”). For further discussion of the relationship
between the changing structure of employment and worker security, see Mark
Berger, The Contingent Employee Benefits Problem, 32 IND. L. REV. 301, 303–
05 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of workplace benefits and the related
problems inherent in contingent employment); Glynn, supra note 2 (explaining
how the disaggregation of firms into several, often independent parts presents
a difficulty in holding firms liable for violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act).
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of an era that has produced a greater alignment of ownership
and control, raising a different set of issues. In this new
technological age, corporate management’s greater flexibility
has permitted it to outpace public regulation and unionization to
acquire greater leverage in labor markets and cross-border
transactions. Rather than recreate the older model of static
regulation, we will consider the possibilities for alternative
approaches that increase labor flexibility and mobility in
parallel ways.
A. THE FIRM OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL ERA AS NETWORK
The firm of the industrial era, with its dependence on static
supply chains, a large trained labor force, and insulation from
competition, is fading. 217 As commercial organization has
become more fluid, the entity-based corporate theory of the
managerial era has also given way to a more individualistic
regime that, like Justice Alito, treats the firm as a legal fiction
that can be discounted or ignored, except where it chooses to
contractually bind itself. 218 These changes in commercial
organization and legal theory parallel and often accelerate a
corresponding set of economic changes. Large corporations no
longer depend to the same degree on a large labor force, nor with
globalization do firms enjoy the same degree of insulation from
competition.219 Instead, commercial actors strive for flexibility,
organizing their enterprises to minimize and concentrate core
sectors, and coordinate them with a rapidly changing mix of
subsidiaries or independent contractors. 220 As a result, the
reciprocity that existed because of corporate dependence on
employee stability and employer provision of secure employment
is rapidly disappearing.221
Firms of various sizes and structures still exist, of course,

217. See BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at xv, 75 (noting that
flexibility, mobility, and network forces have become more dominant, and “the
main source of value added is no longer the exploitation of geographically
located resources (like mines, or especially fertile land), or the exploitation of a
labour force at work, but the ability to take full advantage of the most diverse
kinds of knowledge, to interpret and combine them”).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 5, 9, 17.
219. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 73 (describing the
relationship between global competition, innovation, and “lean” firm principles
that emphasize innovation).
220. Id. at 75.
221. See Davis, supra note 216, at 16–20.
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and so do a number of relatively secure positions.222 Yet even
large and successful firms cannot guarantee their survival in
any particular form. One need only think of the trajectory from
International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) to
Microsoft to Apple and perhaps on to Google and its competitors
to underscore the difference. The same firms that dominated the
American landscape in 1910 continued to do so in 1970.223 The
firms that do so today involve a mix of financial (BerkshireHathaway), tech (Apple), and retail (Walmart) giants in addition
to more traditional energy and auto companies.224 In this era,
individuals may well be bigger than the firms they head; it
remains to be seen whether, twenty years from now, Apple
prospers without Steve Jobs and whether Bill Gates’s
philanthropic ventures become more important than Microsoft’s
business outlook.
For individual employees, the changes are more dramatic.
Neither top executives nor blue collar employees expect to
remain at a single firm. The ambitious see many positions as
stepping stones in a personal saga rather than as a source of
commitment. 225 Workers have minimal or no loyalty—nor
should they, when they have become fungible commodities and
their employers have become transitory. 226 And the business
stars of the new economy are start-ups, willing to take risks that,
if they pay off, will transform the nature of the operation and, if
222. See generally ARNE L. KALLEBERG, GOOD JOBS, BAD JOBS : THE RISE OF
POLARIZED AND PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES,
1970S-2000S (2011) (arguing that the information economy tends to produce
more good jobs and bad jobs, hollowing out the center).
223. Cf. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 92–94, 118–19 (citing to Fortune
financial reports to illustrate the scale of prominent corporations like AT&T and
General Motors, and describing the security inherent in executive life based on
longevity of positions).
224. Indeed, the top ten in the Fortune 500 list now include Walmart, Apple,
Berkshire Hathaway, and CVS Pharmacy in addition to auto and energy giants
such as General Motors, Exxon, and Chevron. Fortune 500, FORTUNE,
http://www.fortune.com/fortune500/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
225. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 93–95 (observing that “the
transition from one project to the next . . . increase[s] one’s employability,” and
also increases opportunism and self-interested behavior; even if the employee
succeeds in becoming more valuable to the company, the company promises in
turn not security, but employability both within the firm and elsewhere).
226. Richard Bales et al., A Comparative Analysis of Labor Outsourcing, 31
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 579, 617 (2014) (“In contrast to the long-term,
relatively stable employment relationships that characterized the
manufacturing-based economy of most of the twentieth century, an increasing
proportion of workers in the United States today are ‘contingent.’”).
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they fail, will doom its existence.227 In this new model, the firm
has become a nexus of private contracts in which identity,
loyalty, and reciprocity play diminished roles, where they
survive at all.228 Scholars call the change in the nature of work
the “casualization of employment.” 229 In this system, Uber,
which supplies automobile rides much like a taxi service, is the
new exemplar. Uber sets up software that will hook up people
who want labor services with people who will provide them. The
infrastructure disappears. The software (and the entrepreneurs
who design it and keep it going) link independent contractors
who provide monetized services directly with paying customers.
While the company makes money, the drivers providing services
may be considered independent contractors rather than
employees (a matter that is currently being litigated).230 They
have independence, including the ability to structure their
working hours and conditions, but no security and no benefits.
And, as Geoffrey Fowler noted, “There’s an Uber for everything
now. . . . Heal sends a doctor on a house call, while Saucey will
rush over alcohol. . . . Dufl will pack your suitcase and Eaze will
reup a medical marijuana supply.”231
In this world, the firm as entity has neither a fixed identity
nor a permanent existence. The meaning of the firm, if it is to
remain viable, has to be seen in different terms.
227. For a discussion of efforts to capture the entrepreneurial spirit (and
employee loyalty) within large companies, see Mark Fenwick & Erik P.M.
Vermeulen, The New Firm, Staying Relevant, Unique & Competitive (Lex
Research Topics in Corp. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 2015-5, 2015),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2659763.
228. Indeed, even though the management literature continues to
emphasize the importance of employee loyalty, such loyalty depends on bonds
of reciprocity that are in much shorter supply. See Hart & Thompson, supra
note 81.
229. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 224.
230. The misclassification lawsuits against Uber and Lyft, alleging that the
companies erroneously classify their drivers as independent contractors rather
than employees, are probably just the first wave of such suits. See, e.g.,
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-CV-03826-EMC, 2016 WL 4398271 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 18, 2016) (upholding a $100 million settlement and retaining the
independent contractor classification, but having Uber agree to implement
drivers’ associations in each state to review grievances); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No.
13-CV-04065-VC, 2016 WL 3561742, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2016) (upholding
a new settlement agreement with both nonmonetary and monetary aspects, the
latter of which “contemplates payment of roughly 17 percent of the value of the
$156 million reimbursement claim”).
231. Geoffrey A. Fowler, There’s an Uber for Everything Now, WALL ST. J.,
(May 5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/theres-an-uber-for-everything-now
-1430845789.
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B. WHAT REMAINS OF CORPORATE IDENTITY AND LOYALTY?
The firms that remain, for better or worse, are subject to
greater competitive pressures and more dynamic marketplaces.
They need to be more nimble to adjust to rapid changes in
technology and the challenges of global markets.232 Within this
framework, companies have adopted leaner production—and
employment—systems. 233 Firms invest less in employees,
preferring those who obtain training and experience elsewhere.
Firms also offer less security in terms of employment or benefits
to the employees they do hire.234 The most ambitious employees
in turn recognize the need to acquire experience, but may view
companies as no more than vehicles to the next position.235
In this new system, how do we understand Coase’s insight
that the advantage of the firm comes from the suppression of the
price system? Part of the answer is that it vindicates that
insight. If we compare skilled and unskilled workers, firms today
contract out (that is, they use market contracts) to secure an
increasing percentage of the unskilled labor they need.236 This
outsourcing may be to call centers in India, to independent
contractors in the United States who provide janitorial services,
or to temp agencies who supply individual workers. The firms
presumably make the calculation Coase described, determining
that the price mechanism works quite well in securing
essentially fungible labor at a time of international competition
and slack markets for unskilled labor.237 Corporations remain
232. See BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 73–75.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 94.
235. See id. at 93–95.
236. See James M. Cooper, The North American Free Trade Agreement and
Its Legacy on the Resolution of Intellectual Property Disputes, 43 CAL. W. INT’L
L.J. 157, 176–77 (2012) (“We are living, at least in the United States, in a postindustrial, or knowledge-based, economy. As the United States outsourced
millions of manufacturing jobs to Mexico, China, and any number of other
industrializing countries with abundant low-cost unskilled labor, the United
States was able to base its economic growth on services and new innovations.”
(footnote omitted)); DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS
THROUGH STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT 9–10 (2010), https://www.dol.gov/
whd/resources/strategicenforcement.pdf.
237. While large firms may thus choose to outsource unskilled services such
as janitorial work, the small businesses that provide such services make
independent calculations about whether to encourage longer worker tenure
through greater investment in their employees. Even if these firms do so,
however, the individual worker may still experience greater employment
instability if the small businesses are more likely than large ones to go
bankrupt, close, and reopen with different management. Cf. Timothy Bates &
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more likely to bring employees in-house to perform more
sophisticated tasks, such as engineering or product design, that
are harder to specify, to supervise, or to divide into discrete
parts. Companies, of course, are also more likely to bring
employees in-house where the skills are valuable, firm specific,
and/or hard to find.238
This dynamic contributes to the growing inequality in
American wages and it recreates a form of class structure within
American firms. If we go back to Galbraith’s description of the
managerial era, he describes different groups within the firm
with varying levels of identification with the firm brand and
varying degrees of loyalty associated with that identification.239
The technological era’s reorganization of commercial activities
makes the concept of firm as entity less critical for each group:
1. Shareholders. This group, both in the managerial era and
today, combines the greatest emphasis on monetary
incentives with the least identification with the firm’s
identity and mission.240
2. Unskilled workers. Galbraith argued that identification
with the firm was least likely to affect the productivity of
these workers.241 In the production line era, these were
the workers most likely in fact to be subject to employer
commands (rather than enjoy discretion), and they are the
group most likely to be outsourced today.242
3. Supervisory personnel (such as foremen), clerical, sales,
and other routine white collar personnel. Today, this
category is much smaller, with the supervisors outsourced
Alfred Nucci, An Analysis of Small Business Size and Rate of Discontinuance,
27 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 4 (Oct. 1989) (discussing statistical findings
demonstrating that firm size inversely correlates with rate of discontinuance).
The creation of these companies, however, has occurred in large part because
larger companies have chosen to deal with potential uncertainty in demand
through outsourcing these activities, in effect shifting the risk of future market
conditions to the small businesses. See BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14,
at 73–74 (describing this outsourcing as part of the process of creating “leaner”
organizations).
238. Andy Sealock & Christopher Stacey, Why Some U.S. Companies Are
Giving up on Outsourcing, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/ciocentral/2013/01/16/why-some-u-s-companies-are-giving-up-on
-outsourcing/#1f368f9a51ba.
239. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 187–91.
240. Id. at 187–88.
241. Id. at 188–90.
242. Id.; Laurie Monahan, Re-Organized Labor: Affirming Labor’s Relevance
by Reframing Its Image and Merging with Allies, 3 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 438,
458–59 (2013).
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with the employees they supervise, routine clerical work
done by computer, and the remaining tasks often
becoming more sophisticated.243
4. Skilled workers: technicians, engineers, sales executives,
scientists, designers, and other specialists who comprise
the technostructure. This is the group for whom firm
identity and loyalty remains most critical, with employers
eager to attract and retain professionals.244 At the same
time, however, information itself has become much more
readily accessible; the most valuable employees are those
adept at finding it, assembling the needed components,
and motivating those around them.245
5. Executives or management. Galbraith wrote that, “[a]s
one moves through these inner circles, identification and
adaptation become increasingly important.”246
Consider now today’s large firm. The two groups whose
tenure has shortened and whose loyalty to the firm has become
more contingent are the unskilled and senior management. 247
And these changes correspond with the creation of more clearly
defined class differences.
At the top, executive pay has increased, it is more tied to
stock options, and executive tenure has shortened. 248 Top
executives, in turn, make considerably more than the next tier
of managers. At the same time, boards have become more
influential and the percentage of outside directors has
increased. 249 As a result, the identification of boards (often
comprised of executives from other companies), top managers,
243. For example, the typing pool is gone, and the group of personal
assistants is much smaller at the same time that administrative assistants
often do things that require more firm-specific knowledge and judgment. See
What Happened to All the Secretaries, GREENKEY RESOURCES: GREEN KEY
BLOG, (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.greenkeyllc.com/blog/what-happened-to-allthe
-secretaries/ (“According to one study of the data, the five years since 2007 saw
businesses eliminating 1.9 million office and administrative support jobs.”)
(citation omitted).
244. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 190–91.
245. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPPELLO, supra note 14, at 75–76.
246. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 191.
247. For discussion of the impact of these changes, see generally Steven N.
Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?, 12 INT’L
REV. FIN. 57 (2012).
248. Id. at 58; Nitzan Shilon, CEO Stock Ownership Policies—Rhetoric and
Reality, 90 IND. L.J. 353, 362 (2015).
249. See Kaplan & Minton, supra note 247, at 59, 75.
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and shareholders with each other has grown, with all of the
groups placing more emphasis on quarterly earnings and share
price.250 This group of officers and directors, whose income and
wealth has reached extraordinary levels, identify to a greater
degree with each other.251 They share similar perspectives and
often set each other’s salaries.252
Their benchmarks for success have become more focused on
the short-term, and their careers are less likely to take place
within a single company. The motivation of this group has
accordingly changed most, from identification with a particular
firm’s objectives to a more generic management focus that
combines a greater association of firm well-being with share
prices and individual success with financial rewards. 253 This
group, which constitutes a new elite, identifies much less with
particular firms than either entrepreneurs (think Mark
Zuckerberg’s association with Facebook) or the technical class of
engineers and other professionals.254
At the same time, companies still compete for skilled
workers and seek to motivate their employees through
identification with the firm.255 These workers continue to have
relatively secure positions with substantial benefits,256 even as
overall firm employment has declined. 257 Nonetheless, their
career trajectories have also changed as they see advancement
less in terms of the climbing of a fixed career ladder within a
given firm and more in terms of “employability,” that is, the
250. See andré douglas pond cummings et al., Toward a Critical Corporate
Law Pedagogy and Scholarship, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 397, 401 n.19 (2014);
Shilon, supra note 248.
251. See cummings et al., supra note 250, at 401 (arguing that “[t]he ability
of the CEO to stack the board of directors with cultural clones is key to the new
power of the CEO”).
252. See Bernice Grant, Independent Yet Captured: Compensation
Committee Independence After Dodd-Frank, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 761, 778 (2014)
(“CEOs who serve as directors of other companies have self-interested
incentives to approve high compensation for the CEOs of the companies on
whose board they serve because CEO pay is set using peer group comparisons.”).
253. See, e.g., cummings et al., supra note 250, at 399 (“CEOs act as the new
potentates in American society and manage their firms as personal fiefdoms.”).
254. See WILLIAM LAZONICK, SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY IN THE NEW
ECONOMY? BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND HIGH TECH EMPLOYMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 12–13, 197 (2009) (reporting on the change in orientation of
executives from a career ladder in a single company to salaries that are set by
the external market).
255. HISLOP, supra note 51.
256. KALLEBERG, supra note 222, at 70–71, 78, 86.
257. Id. at 92–93.
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acquisition of skills and experiences that make them more
marketable both within the firm and without.258
While differences in pay have increased between top
management and the professional group, so too have the wages
in these skilled positions increased faster than the wages of the
unskilled. Looking at the economy as a whole, blue collar
workers (particularly men) saw their wages stagnate and their
employment instability increase in the period from 1979 to
2008. 259 In contrast, male college graduates’ employment
stability did not change and their income continued to increase,
though those with only Bachelor of Arts degrees have seen their
incomes level off after 2000.260
This creates three groups with radically different
identification with companies: (1) a management elite that views
the company from without, as part of a group of directors,
managers, and shareholders likely to see the company as a
means to produce profits rather than as an entity of importance
in itself; (2) an unskilled group with little job security; and (3) a
skilled group that management would like to retain. This third
group constitutes the core of most firms and the group for whom
corporate ethos remains important to the coordination of
behavior. Even for this group, however, the strength of firm
identity and corresponding employee loyalty have weakened as
the firms themselves have become more dynamic and employee
career paths have become more likely to involve lateral moves.261
Part III.B has considered the distinct paths charted by
various pools of employees, managers, and directors of the new
era corporation. Part III.C addresses what has happened to the
interests of the firm itself. It also offers a normative vision of
what corporate rights and responsibilities should be after the
death of the managerial firm.
C. THE NEW ERA OF CORPORATE INTERESTS, RIGHTS, AND
RESPONSIBILITIES
Corporation, n. An ingenious device for obtaining individual profit

258. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 93. The authors emphasize
that this acquisition of experience increases personal capital and thus
“employability,” but it also increases opportunism and self-interested behavior.
Id. at 94–95.
259. See JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW
INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 46 (2014).
260. See id. at 80–81.
261. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 94 n.lxix.
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without individual responsibility. -Ambrose Bierce262

The analysis in this article suggests that the description of
the firm in Hobby Lobby, a description that treats the firm as no
more than a legal fiction that serves as an instrument of its
owners, is an accurate description of the shift in management
thinking and the corresponding celebration of shareholder
supremacy in corporate law.263 What neither the case nor the
commentary on it adequately addresses are the consequences of
that description. Firms have in fact become more fluid, dynamic
networks. 264 The accompanying changes have remade the
relationship between owners and companies, management and
labor, financial elites and other citizens. Much of this change,
like the analysis in Hobby Lobby itself, has been unidirectional
rather than reciprocal; that is, corporate owners have remade
the terms of the commercial entities to reflect their own
interests, while support for workers has not similarly adapted to
more fluid, dynamic, and network-like workplaces.265 To do so
requires going beyond the decision itself to examine the
realignment of public, corporate and individual interests, rights,
and responsibilities.
It also requires asking the question Ambrose Bierce raised
in 1911 and Dodd and Berle debated in 1930: Is corporate form
once again an opportunity for individual profit without
individual responsibility? And if so, how should the state of the
technological era respond?
1. Hobby Lobby and the End of Reciprocity
With the changes in the nature of the firm, legal and social
policy have only just begun to adjust. The decision in Hobby
Lobby, on the one hand, recognizes the changes in the nature of
the firm, as it has become principally an instrument to advance
the interests of its owners. 266 It does not, however, fully
acknowledge the implications for programs like the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) that follow. Nor can it. Just as the Berle-Dodd
262. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL’S DICTIONARY 29 (1999).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 11, 97, 199–203.
264. Vermeulen, supra note 15, at 712–13.
265. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, How To Beat the Bots, N.Y. TIMES (June
10,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/opinion/thomas-friedman
-how-to-beat-the-bots.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=opinion
-c-col-left-region&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left
-region&_r=0.
266. See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
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debate of the thirties ended in stalemate because the solutions
to the corporate abuses of the twenties lay outside of corporate
law, so, too, does the debate over Hobby Lobby’s conception of the
corporation fail to the extent it focuses solely on the legal
characterization of corporate actors. Instead, the focus ought to
be on the nature of the public-private partnerships possible in
an area in which the firm as entity disappears from view. In
accordance with this analysis, employer-subsidized health care
becomes an anachronism.267
At the height of the managerial era, the government sought
to promote the greater public good through corporations. The
public safety net that took hold during the New Deal and
continued through the Great Society reforms of the 1960s
assumed that large employers were part of the solution,
conferring health care insurance, pension benefits, and greater
employment security on employees. Public programs such as
Social Security and Medicaid supplemented what were seen as
more primary employment-based systems and large
corporations were seen not just as private commercial entities
serving exclusively private ends, but public citizens.
Corporations in turn expanded provisions of these benefits
because of generous tax subsidies, 268 and favorable tax
treatment of corporations has often been justified by
assumptions that the firms would take significant responsibility
for employees. 269 The history of special tax treatment and of
federal, state, and local economic development incentives for
corporations has been premised on the idea that businesses will
create jobs, build community partnerships, and pump revenue

267. Our purpose here is not to compare the benefits of employer-provided
coverage—natural risk-pooling, low overhead costs, generally high-quality
coverage, and employers serving as advocates in the claim process—with the
costs or against the advantages of other systems. The point is one of structural
ideology: with the disappearance of longer term employment, the logical
question is whether benefits should be attached to a single job.
268. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-141R-15, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2015-2019, at 28–42 tbl.1 (2015),
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4857.
Before
adoption of the ACA, the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance was
the largest federal tax expenditure, with an annual value of $246.1 billion in
2007. David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of
Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed To Prevent Avoidable
Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669, 681 (2012).
269. Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of
Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 318
(2011).
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into both the national economy and particular locales.270 These
assumptions are no longer reflected in fact nor, after Hobby
Lobby, in law.
Instead, Justice Alito’s analysis, in simultaneously treating
the firm as a fiction and imbuing it with the constitutional rights
of its owners, leads to the conclusion that the owners are the firm
and they therefore have rights without obligations to anyone
else.271 The corollary to the conclusion ought to be that neither
the corporation nor its owners are suitable partners to advance
community ends. The public-private partnership that reached
its height with the Galbraithian firm cannot therefore continue,
and the focus should shift from corporate rights to the
vindication of community responsibilities in other ways.
While the implications of Hobby Lobby go well beyond
health care, it is perhaps fitting that heath care underlies the
decision because what has happened to health care perhaps best
represents the unsustainability of continuing efforts to advance
public purposes through corporate firms. As we indicated
above,272 the United States to a much greater degree than other
developed countries has tied health care to employment and
done so because of the nature of the industrial firm at midnineteenth century. The critical government decision came
through the tax system, allowing firms to deduct the cost of
health insurance as a business expense without counting the
benefit as income to the worker. 273 The result allowed the
government to promote a taxpayer-subsidized benefit by acting
through private parties. Firms received a tax break for
something they wished to do anyway to remain competitive in
an era of tight labor markets, and the government relied on the
firms’ willingness to offer insurance to advance public ends that
justified the relaxation of wartime controls on wages.274
The change in the nature of employment, on the other hand,
270. See, e.g., Randle B. Pollard, “Was the Deal Worth It?”: The Dilemma of
States with Ineffective Economic Incentives Programs, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1,
2, 8–10 (2015).
271. See infra notes 281–283 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 134 and accompanying text; see also DAVIS, supra note
5, at 117 (describing provision of social services through employers rather than
government).
273. See infra note 284 and accompanying text.
274. See Eleanor D. Kinney, For Profit Enterprise in Health Care: Can It
Contribute to Health Reform?, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 405, 409 (2010) (describing
the shift from direct payment with only ten percent of the American public
insured in 1940 to employer-provided insurance covering seventy-two percent
of the American public by 1957).
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is part of what necessitated health care reform in the first place,
touching off cascading changes many viewed as a crisis in
insurance coverage. First, fewer employees work in long-term
positions that provide health care. 275 Younger workers, in
particular, have become less likely to have secure employment
or employer-provided health care than their parents; yet, the
presence of younger, healthier workers contributes to the
creation of low cost insurance pools.276 Without the presence of
these workers, employer insurance costs go up. Second, with
more employee mobility, voluntary or not, the ability to gain
coverage for pre-existing conditions has become critical to more
families as wage-earners switch jobs more frequently.277 Third,
with greater outsourcing, more employees who would have
worked in large companies now work in smaller units. These
smaller units are less likely than larger ones to have a
representative population and, as a result, may have a harder
time finding affordable private health insurance. A single
employee with cancer, who would not affect the insurance pool
of a General Motors, can dramatically increase the insurance
premiums in an office of ten. Fourth, as fewer employees have
health care and as premiums rise both in many places of
employment and for non-employer plans, these plans become a
bad deal for the healthy, and people who are already sick become
an even larger portion of those who purchase them.278 The ACA
sought to counter these trends (and avoid what some predicted
would be a “death spiral” in insurance coverage)279 by mandating
275. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Health Care Choice Act: The
Individual Insurance Market and the Politics of “Choice,” 29 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 473, 474 (2007) (observing that “the erosion of employer-sponsored
coverage has increased the ranks of the uninsured”); see also U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, All Employees: Professional and Business Services: Temporary
Help
Services,
FED.
RES.
ECON.
DATA
(Feb.
5,
2016),
http://www.research.stlouisfed
.org/fred2/series/TEMPHELPS (charting the rise of temporary workers).
276. Kara Brandeisky, Why Young Millennials Are Turning down Health
Coverage at Work, TIME (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.time.com/money/
3821525/health-insurance-age-26.
277. Pendo, supra note 275, at 479 (discussing high rates of rejection for
those with pre-existing conditions).
278. See Joseph P. Newhouse, Assessing Health Reform’s Impact on Four Key
Groups of Americans, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1714, 1716 (2010) (“[T]he individual and
small-group market is dysfunctional.”).
279. Elizabeth A. Pendo, Uninsured in America: Life and Death in the Land
of Opportunity, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 117, 118 (2008) (book review) (“The death
spiral is a term used to describe the process by which a pool of people covered
by an insurance plan loses its relatively healthy members, causing costs to
increase for the remaining members. Unchecked, the spiral continues until the
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employer provision of health insurance, individual participation,
state exchanges for those without employer coverage, and
specification of the minimum level of coverage qualifying plans
had to provide. 280 The mandate that employers provide
insurance and the inclusion of contraception in the mandated
coverage set up the First Amendment clash in Hobby Lobby, but
the declining relationship between employment and health
insurance is one of the factors that made the ACA necessary in
the first place.
Alito’s analysis in the Hobby Lobby decision underscores the
rejection of the assumptions that once made employer-provided
insurance appropriate, without acknowledging the broader
implications. The analysis combines two elements. First, the
majority opinion reflects the perspective of the seventies’ agencycost theorists, who rejected the conception of the corporation as
an entity tied to the well-being of employees and community. In
language that could be drawn from the Jensen-Meckling article,
he observes that the firm is a fiction and, since the firm is a
fiction, it has no importance as an entity.281 That is, when the
owners decide to act through corporate form, the corporation has
no meaning separate from the identity and interests of its
owners—and the owners are free to assert whatever rights they
would have as individuals.282
Second, Alito further concludes that when the owners choose
to act through corporate form, and to take advantage of the
benefits state chartered corporate form confers, they acquire no
obligations to either employees or the community by virtue of
that decision. 283 Thus, in acting through corporate form, the
Hobby Lobby owners can insist on a First Amendment right to
claim the tax and other competitive advantages of governmentsubsidized health care for their employees284 and still pick and
insurance plan can no longer be sustained and ultimately ‘dies.’”).
280. 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2012).
281. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
282. Indeed, at least one scholar argues that the religious freedom rights
granted to Hobby Lobby as a corporation exceed those available to individuals.
See Yvette Ann Walker, Note, More than Human: Modern Expansion of
Corporate Personhood Rights in Hobby Lobby, 24 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST.
297, 324 (2015).
283. As Justice Ginsburg’s dissent indicates, the decision in this respect is
at odds with earlier decisions about the structure of the marketplace that
applied to individual proprietors as well as companies. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct.
at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 2776–77 (majority opinion) (emphasizing benefit to employer
from the ability to provide health insurance benefits, and from the substantial
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choose among the provisions included in the plans on the basis
of their individual, idiosyncratic preferences.285 Moreover, while
Alito gives considerable weight to the employers’ right of access
to health care tax subsidies, in spite of the fact that they could
choose not to provide health care at all, he minimizes the
employees’ interests because of the government’s purported
ability to deliver contraceptive access in other ways.286
The logical extension of this analysis, however, is the
separation of employment and health care altogether, and not
just because it solves the religious freedom issue. Employers, of
course, acted to advance their own interests during the
managerial era as well, but the provision of heath care through
employer subsidies arose during an era in which management
and labor issues were more aligned. 287 Today, the larger
question is why employers should continue to be a vehicle for the
extension of benefits necessary to human flourishing at all. The
initial adoption of government-subsidized employee benefits
reflects the particular constellation of forces at play in the
United States during World War II and its aftermath.288 The net
effect of employer provided health, however, was broad-based
coverage through large, private entities that disguised the cost
of a large-scale public program. Subsequent changes in the
nature of employment change the justifiability of such an
approach, for reasons implicit in the Alito opinion.
As a practical matter, the large firms of the managerial era
tax benefits); see also Matthew A. Melone, Corporations and Religious Freedom:
Hobby Lobby Stores—A Missed Opportunity To Reconcile a Flawed Law with a
Flawed Health Care System, 48 IND. L. REV. 461, 479 (2015).
285. In Hobby Lobby, the owners objected to the morning after pill as an
abortifacient, even though the weight of scientific opinion is that it prevents
ovulation but cannot prevent the implantation of an embryo in the uterine wall,
and therefore does not cause abortion. See, e.g., INT’L FED’N OF GYNECOLOGY &
OBSTETRICS & INT’L CONSORTIUM FOR EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION,
MECHANISM
OF
ACTION
(2012),
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/
packages/pdf/health/contraception/ICEC_FIGO_MoA_Statement_March_2012
.pdf (collecting research).
286. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780, 2782 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the government could itself “assume the cost of providing” the
contraceptives or could replicate the accommodation provided for religiously
affiliated nonprofit organizations). But see Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel,
Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics,
124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2591 (2015) (noting difficulties with the proposal).
287. See DAVIS, supra note 5, at 42. In addition, given the dominance of large
corporations in the American economy in the postwar era, the idiosyncratic
preferences of a Henry Ford or owners like the family that controls Hobby Lobby
became less important. Id. at 43–45.
288. Id. at 42.
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both sought to advance secular, commercial interests and saw
more of a unity of interests when it came to accessing public
subsidies to provide worker benefits. This is true in part because
of the existence of a tighter labor market, which encouraged
greater efforts to invest in and retain workers,289 and because
companies strove for greater overall stability, seeking gradual
growth to a greater degree than share price maximization.290 In
Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court effectively concludes that
corporate owners neither have a duty to maximize share price
(or to act to promote secular, commercial corporate purposes) nor
to take the interests of their employees into account in taking
advantage of the tax subsidies of program designed primarily for
the employees’ benefit.291 The import of the decision is limited as
a practical matter because large publicly traded corporations are
unlikely to choose to advance religious purposes, but such
corporations are also more likely than Hobby Lobby to move
plants overseas, outsource activities to independent contractors
to reduce benefits, or convert full time positions to part-time to
avoid the need to pay for health care benefits. 292 As an
ideological matter, the Hobby Lobby opinion underscores the
conclusion that owners have no obligation, morally or legally, to
consider the interests of their employees, and, legally, they have
no obligation to do so even where exercise of their religious
preferences imposes costs on the employees with respect to
access to health care provisions designed to minimize public
costs (pregnancy, which would be covered by Hobby Lobby’s
publicly subsidized employee plans, is more expensive than
contraception) and increase employee benefits.293
Moreover, the continued existence of employer health care
insurance continues to promote class-based differences in access
that reinforce the impact of employment-based inequalities.
Every person requires access to health care at some point in her
life, and health care has become that much more expensive
because of the availability of third party payers, further

289. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN
EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY 53–57 (2008).
290. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 104, 241–43.
291. See McDonnell, supra note 6, at 791.
292. See Roya Wolverson, Outsourcing Jobs and Taxes, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/united-states/outsourcing-jobs
-taxes/p21777.
293. See McDonnell, supra note 6, at 779 (discussing costs imposed on
employees).
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increasing the costs to those who lack health insurance.294 Yet,
not only do employers provide health care insurance in large part
because of generous tax subsidies,295 but the subsidies provide
perverse incentives to do so in ways that disproportionately
benefit the well-off. 296 The ACA, by retaining most of the
employer-oriented system, creates much larger subsidies for
high income individuals through employer-sponsored plans, and
much larger tax subsidies for most lower-income taxpayers
through the exchanges. 297 This increases the incentives for
employers to recruit hard-to-get, higher-paid employees through
employer-provided health care benefits while finding ways not
to include low income workers as full-time employees at all.298
Even if the workers who end up with plans through the
exchanges enjoy comparable health care benefits, the result
reinforces employment-based inequalities, and undermines
political support for the ACA. 299 In contrast, single-payer
systems in other countries decouple health care and
employment, creating more uniform identification (good or bad)
with a single system.
Moreover, separating health care from employment would
not only be fairer, it would be more transparent. The existing
system disguises an important government benefit—health care
insurance—as a perquisite of private employment. 300 It also
cloaks the true cost to taxpayers, the cross-subsidization that
benefits the wealthy at the expense of the poor, and employer
294. See, e.g., Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: How Outrageous Pricing and
Egregious Profits Are Destroying Our Health Care, TIME, Mar. 4, 2013, at 17–
55.
295. Gamage, supra note 268, at 680–81 (noting that even before the ACA,
health care was the largest tax subsidy).
296. Indeed, before the ACA, the individuals who did not have employerprovided plans faced both substantially higher health care costs if they paid out
of pocket and substantially higher premiums for private insurance (if they could
get it at all given pre-existing conditions) than they would probably have faced
if employer-sponsored health insurance did not exist. Id. at 676–83.
297. See id. at 672.
298. Id. at 671–72.
299. That is, it undermines political support to the extent that those with
employer-based plans fail to recognize that the taxpayers are also paying for
their plans to a large degree through the tax system. In addition, the role of
Medicaid-type benefits, which are often stigmatized where they are available,
and which make many workers worse off where they are not, further
complicates the effects. See Sally C. Pipes, The Medicaid Poverty Trap Is
Growing
Worse,
N.Y.
POST
(July
29,
2015),
http://www.nypost.com/2015/07/29/the
-medicaid-poverty-trap-is-growing-worse.
300. Gamage, supra note 268.
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choices, that in the absence of precedent-setting Supreme Court
litigation, are often invisible to employees.301
While a sudden elimination of employer-sponsored health
insurance would be destabilizing302 and health care reforms of
any kind may be impossible today, 303 the time has come to
establish the principle that the government needs to counter
more fluid and dynamic business enterprises through measures
that make individual workers similarly nimble, mobile—and
less dependent on particular employers. A health care system
entirely independent of employment is, in this sense, similar to
fully portable pension plans in contributing to worker
autonomy. 304 Moreover, the ACA may ultimately speed
voluntary employer choices to drop health care coverage.305 The
ACA’s mandate, which only took effect during the 2015–16
enrollment period, provides that employers must provide a
certain level of health care or pay a fine.306 The fine in many
cases is less than the cost of providing insurance, and the fines
can be used to help finance the subsidies built into operation of

301. In the absence of the publicity attending the Hobby Lobby decision, for
example, employees might never know that the reason their health plan does
not cover an intrauterine device (IUD) is because of their employer’s religious
objection to a benefit other employers are required to cover. See Seema
Mohapatra, Time To Lift the Veil of Inequality in Health-Care Coverage: Using
Corporate Law To Defend the Affordable Care Act, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 137,
155 (2015); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, One Cheer for Hobby Lobby:
Improbable Alternatives, Truly Strict Scrutiny, and Third-Party Employee
Burdens, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 153, 170 (2015) (“[A]ccording to counsel, [the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act] should be read to protect a multi-billion
dollar corporation against a marginal increase in its operating expenses as the
cost of observing its religious beliefs against IUDs and other emergency
contraception, but not to prevent the same corporation from shifting the costs
of that observance onto lower-income employees and dependents who believe
and practice differently.”).
302. We are indebted to Daniel Schwarcz for this and several other points.
303. Indeed, many observers have noted the illusory nature of the Supreme
Court’s insistence that the government could find other ways to provide for
employee access to contraception, given Congressional determination to
undermine the ACA more generally. See Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 286, at
2550–51.
304. See Gamage, supra note 268, at 715 (proposing replacing existing tax
subsidies with tax credits based on individual income). While this would not
eliminate employer participation, it could be a first step in that direction.
305. Rick Lindquist & Paul Zane Pilzner, The End of Employer-Provided
Health Insurance, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2015) (predicting that “90% of all
businesses will drop offering health insurance” in the next decade).
306. Obamacare Employer Mandate, OBAMACARE.NET, http://www
.obamacare.net/obamacare-employer-mandate (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2870076

ARTICLE_CLEAN COPY_MINN_NOV_14.DOCX

2017]

THE DEATH OF THE FIRM

11/15/2016 2:42 PM

1092

the system.307 Eliminating the employer mandate, recalibrating
existing subsidies, and/or tailoring the requirements and the
fine to encourage the gradual elimination of employment-based
plans could gradually shift most insurance coverage to the
exchanges, eliminating the employer role.308 If that happened—
if all health care depended on access to government-run
exchanges or to public programs like Medicare—it would both
increase worker flexibility and eliminate the fiction that
employer-provided programs are private market creations.
Whether one favors a single-payer, government-run system or a
more free-market-oriented system of individually purchased
private insurance policies, it is hard to justify the continuation
of an employer-based system that provides substantially less
coverage than it once did and whose primary effect is to disguise
a substantial federal subsidy for favored employees.309
2. The Need for a New Social Contract
Ultimately, the State needs to contribute to a new model of
the networked worker that matches the networked firm and
resets the balance between the two. Silicon Valley provides a
model. Highly-sought-after workers start with technical skills,
get entry-level jobs that give them experience, move to the next
firm as they mature, and hope to start their own companies.
They do so in an environment where private equity funding for
start-ups is readily available, failure is not catastrophic in part
because the entrepreneur’s own assets do not finance new
companies, and the forgiving job market provides other
307. See LINDA J. BLUMBERG ET AL., URBAN INST., WHY NOT JUST
ELIMINATE THE EMPLOYER MANDATE? 4 (2014), http://www.urban.org/sites/
default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413117%20-%20Why-Not-Just-Eliminate
-the-Employer-Mandate-.pdf (finding that fines may generate substantial
revenue from employers choosing not to provide coverage).
308. The Urban Institute has proposed eliminating the employer mandate
in any event, arguing that it is unnecessary and has distorting effects on
employment. Id.; see also Bob Seng & Holly Fistler, King v. Burwell: Last Piece
of Obamacare Puzzle?, 72 BENCH & B. MINN., Aug. 2015, at 16, 18 (“There’s a
pretty good argument that the employer mandate isn’t necessary . . . . [But]
chances of [it] going away without eliminating the individual mandate are very
low.”).
309. See Gamage, supra note 268, at 686–87; Melone, supra note 284, at
465–66. A complete examination of health care alternatives is beyond the scope
of this Article, and the purpose of this example is not to defend either a singlepayer system or the existing exchanges, which allow individuals to buy private
insurance policies at subsidized prices, but to evaluate the consequences of the
uncoupling of employment and benefits—which is already occurring. See
Gamage, supra note 268, at 690.
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opportunities.310
Silicon Valley is obviously an elite model, but the elements
that make valued employees better off than the rest of the
country once characterized a larger part of the country as a
whole. First, the job market for skilled workers is tight, just as
the job market for blue collar workers was also tight in the
postwar period of full employment policies. 311 Second, the
financing of new ventures for employees who seek to set off on
their own is equity-based, not debt-based. 312 This means the
entrepreneur, even if not ultimately successfully, acquires new
skills and experience without being crushed by loans, leaving her
free to go on to the next opportunity. In contrast, for most others,
the acquisition of valuable education, experience, and skills has
become riskier and more expensive. Third, employee benefits are
highly portable. Pensions systems today are primarily defined
contributions systems313 and the ACA eliminates the ability of
insurers to exclude pre-existing conditions.314 Finally, the high
demand for skilled employees creates reinforcing virtuous cycles:
310. See DAVIS, supra note 5, at 125–26 (describing the flexicurity system in
Denmark, which facilitates such a model).
311. If labor markets generally were tighter, employers would have greater
incentives to invest in and retain workers. See, e.g., Steve Matthews, Tight Job
Market in U.S. Cities Prompts Higher Pay, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 16, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-16/tight-job-market
-in-u-s-cities-prompts-higher-pay.
312. See Kurtis Urien & David Groshoff, An Essay Inquiry: Will the Jobs
Act’s Transformative Regulatory Regime for Equity Offerings Cost Investment
Bankers’ Jobs?, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 559, 568–69 (2014) (detailing venture
capitalist, angel investor, and crowdfunding methods of equity financing).
William Barker has explained the present, somewhat perverse, tax incentives
as follows:
The current system therefore results in high effective tax rates on
equity-financed investments and low effective rates on debt-financed
investment. This provides incentives for businesses to finance new
investments with debt, and to maintain a higher level of debt in their
capital structure, increasing the likelihood of financial distress and
bankruptcy.
William B. Barker, A Common Sense Corporate Tax: The Case for a DestinationBased, Cash Flow Tax on Corporations, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 955, 962 n.46
(2012).
313. Just How Common Are Defined Benefit Plans?, CNN MONEY,
http://www.money.cnn.com/retirement/guide/pensions_basics.moneymag/index
7.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) (noting that four percent of private sector
workers have only a defined benefit plan for retirement, “down from 60% in the
early 1980s”).
314. See Gamage, supra note 268, at 678 (noting that denial of insurance
coverage to individuals with pre-existing conditions is “a practice banned by the
ACA”).
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employers who need to compete for valued employees offer more
to retain the employees they attract. Silicon Valley is known for
its employee perks that include everything from on-site gyms to
the notorious Google Bus that runs between San Francisco and
the Google offices in the South Bay.
In contrast, the labor market for the country as a whole
reflects policies that produce opposite cycles. Government
policies have sought to battle inflation (even if that means a
slack labor market), encouraged the atrophy of wage and hour
laws, promoted trade to the detriment of worker protections, and
undermined union protections.315 Over the last thirty years, the
law regarding responsibilities of corporations has changed,
contributing to corporate flexibility (and slack labor markets)
through a wholesale assault on fiscal stimulus, unionization, and
worker protections. 316 Paradoxically, Congress and the U.S.
Supreme Court have rewarded diminished corporate investment
in workers and communities with reduced public obligations.317
Moreover, with greater emphasis on short-term share prices and
more competitive and rapidly changing markets, even executives
who might ideally like to provide more for workers have a harder
time doing so. 318 These policies reflect changes in which
corporate owners and executives advance their own interests
independently of the firm while workers increasingly enjoy
neither reliable employment nor comparable ability to secure
their own interests as independent actors. The result requires
rethinking the relationship between individuals and firms not
only at the top, where the transformation now appears to be
largely complete, but throughout society, as reciprocal
institutions that allow workers to adjust to the new economy
have yet to be conceived.
To change these patterns requires changing the interlocking
patterns of law, economics, and ideology. This requires policies
that make workers more valuable, encouraging companies to
invest more to train and retain the employees they have. Doing
so requires rethinking the sources of investment in workers.
315. See, e.g., RAYMOND J. AHEARN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
GLOBALIZATION, WORKER INSECURITY, AND POLICY APPROACHES 4–7 (2012),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34091.pdf.
316. See, e.g., Frank Clemente, Congress’ Corporate Tax Cuts Punish
Americans, CHI. TRIB. (May 28, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/
daily-southtown/opinion/ct-sta-tax-fairness-st-0529-20150528-story.html.
317. See Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1470–73 (2013).
318. See supra text accompanying notes 11, 15, 139, 199, and 204.
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These policies, first, start with education, making it more
affordable. Second, basic benefits such as health care should be
independent of employment. Third, unemployed workers should
enjoy greater assistance in going back to school, retraining for
needed skills, or relocating to be able to take advantage of new
positions. Finally, the government should serve as an employer
of the last resort, addressing infrastructure and service needs in
schools, hospitals, and other arenas that serve public needs.
With the adoption of programs that give workers greater
flexibility, employers would have to compete more effectively for
labor, touching off a change in private labor relationships. If,
after all, the firm is no more than a fiction that serves the ends
of its owners, new systems should arise that allow workers to
compete in a dynamic, networked world.
CONCLUSION
This Article has described the broad set of changes that have
allowed corporate owners to respond to a more competitive
marketplace by becoming more flexible in the way they employ
workers without giving workers the tools to become more flexible
in turn. In the process, owners, like the Greens of the Hobby
Lobby case, have become more independent of the firms they
control, while the workers they employ remain dependent on the
jobs they hold for basic requirements such as health care. The
rise of the large industrial firm involved a concentration of power
in a control bloc that could use the firms of that era to their own
ends; the ultimate solution to that concentration of power
required the creation of countervailing powers in labor and
government that responded to the rootedness of larger brickand-mortar entities. 319 The solutions did not come from
corporate law itself, but from outside it.320
In similar fashion, it is possible to conclude that Hobby
Lobby is correctly decided to the extent it holds that corporate
owners can create a closely held company committed to religious
principles,321 and still unfair in the degree to which it privileges
corporate owners over corporate employees in the
implementation of a program designed to serve public ends. The
larger solution, however, requires reconsidering the role of
workers in a more fluid, dynamic marketplace, and that requires
recreating labor markets in which workers enjoy greater
319. See supra text accompanying notes 115–120.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 122–123.
321. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 6, at 780.
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negotiating power. In the immediate context of Hobby Lobby,
that should mean separating employment and health care
altogether. Employer provided health care exists because of tax
subsidies and these subsidies benefit those with higher marginal
tax rates over those with lower marginal rates, those with secure
benefit-paying jobs over those with more transient or part-time
employment, and companies that wish to provide health care to
enhance their competitive advantage in tighter labor markets
over those employers who do not feel the need to do so.322 These
distinctions have become untenable as a ground for public
subsidies, and the most logical solution is to abolish them. Every
individual should have access to health care and the greatest
public subsidies should not be accorded on the basis of these
distinctions.
The industrial firm is dead. It is time to recognize that the
firm of the technological era is a different beast. The long-term
forces have remade the commercial marketplace, simultaneously
increasing competition among firms and allowing the wellpositioned and the nimble to reap disproportionate rewards. The
solution going forward should be new strategies designed to
allow workers the flexibility to also realize the rewards of the
new system, and to find security in ways more independent of
long-term employment. To that end, the emphasis should be not
on enhancing the “entity” nature of the corporation, but instead
in strengthening the networks that allow individuals to become
similarly independent actors. The active role of the state must
be to help individuals thrive in a networked world. Just as health
care should be reconceived as a state-individual relation without
the employer as intermediary, so too does the State need to
engage in a large-scale project to reconsider its role vis-à-vis
corporations. With a more even playing field, corporate actors
may once again find that entities capable of supplying identity
and commanding loyalty obtain competitive advantages in the
marketplace as well as in the world of public opinion. In the
meantime, the price for leaner firms, which have jettisoned
public obligations, ought to be fewer public subsidies with more
explicit strings attached for those that remain.

322. See Linda J. Blumberg et al., Why Employers Will Continue To Provide
Health Insurance: The Impact of the Affordable Care Act, 49 INQUIRY 116, 117–
18 (2012). But see supra text accompanying notes 287–288.
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